D Sasheej Hegde effaced. The present, then, is not merely regulatory and/or constitutive, but also— if I may—postulatory—registering the 'presentness' of an 'epoch', a state of affairs, to its time, being given a quality, a 'newness', a specificity, without ever coming to terms with that 'newness', its specificity. We can elaborate. 107 Since 'the present is the (transcendental?) precondition of the possibility of the present, it must be demonstrable how it makes the present, as also itself, possible. And this, it seems to me, recalls the 'limit'—the anachronism—from which all reflections in, and of, the present must spring (and) return. The imperative— never explicit to the reflection, to the 'limit'—to distinguish between the sense internal, or proper, to the present and the circumstances of the present: that any definition of the present as 'present must suppose this distinction. The distinction is problematical, 'anachronous', if you will, not (only) because it is not possible (for, any definition of specificity—the present as 'present—must involve encountering a ground that is not specific to the circumstances—the present—in question),4 but because in doubling between two definitions of the present—one, what concerns 'making sense' of present (the delineation of the present), and two, 'making present the present (the definition of its specificity), and thus, postulatory—it leaves open the question just what it is in the present is legitimate, its own, or being legitimated: indeed, even, that no 'present can live up to the claim of plenitude, or integrity, which it makes for itself.5 It may still be argued that 'the present, even if it can never live up to its claims, always entails encountering a ground that is not its own—and, therefore, a remnant of sorts—is yet an occupation, a 're-occupation' in a new way.6 But this, too, cannot sufficiently rearticulate our question of the place of the present, of the anachronism that is 'the present'; and, indeed, introduces other ambiguities as well. Suffice to add that where the concept of 're-occupation' is not without its problem (the that which re-occupies, or rather, the that from which the re-occupation proceeds, cannot be anything other than, or separated from, the initial or first instance of occupation itself: and so, what's new?), the expropriative—(of an 'occupation', an incursion, really, into time) appropriative (of the return of an 'occupation' to itself, in time) dialectic of time that it implies, or supposes, is, in a deep sense, obscure. Because, one, re-occupation is always in time but, where re-occupation is supposed to be over time, it is therefore outside time, and, two, where re-occupation endures, a 'moving image of eternity'—of the re-occupation being nothing other than the occupation itself—then, re-occupation cannot be in time but as time: the occupation and the re-occupation are one, the 'same', eternity.7 Anachronism is but 'the present, both the 'limit and the condition of its possibility.8 III. FRAMEWORK? There is an 'uncanniness' about the foregoing section (I should be saying, fragment)—and not just what it is alluding to, or the way in which it inscribes itself. Numbers 25-26