4 SOCIAL SCIENTIST underlying it, was developing a perception and lucid class clarity on the nature of fascism and the tactics necessary to fight this menace. In no other individual in the revolutionary history of that period was this unmatchable combination found, of the working out of the theory of fascism with the creative practice of arming the working class with the weapons to fight this onslaught. In this lies the perennial attraction of the life and work of Dimitrov. As a leader of the Bulgarian communists, in 1923 he played a prominent role in the fight against the fascist take-over in Bulgaria and headed the insurrection of September 1923, the failure of which forced him into exile for 22 long years. In that sense, among the prominent communist contemporaries of his period in the Comin-tern—Thorez, Kuusinen, Thaelmann, Gottwald, Pieck and the Soviet Communists—he was the first to be experienced in the battle against fascism. Only the Italian Communist leaders like Gramsci and Togli-atti had this experience earlier with Mussolini's take-over in Italy in 1922. As an emigre in Europe, while heading the work of the West European Bureau of the Executive of the Comintern (C I ) he revealed while dealing with communist work in theBalkans and Western Europe, a growing perception and an awareness of the nature of fascism and the correct tactics to combat it, which preceded the common understanding of many of his contemporaries in the communist parties' leading circles. There is evidence to suggest that he participated in March 1929 in the work of the international anti-fascist congress in Berlin which was attended by 300 delegates from 24 countries.1 Following this, Dimitrov directed the work of the conference of the communist parties of central and south-east Europe at Konstanz, Germany, to discuss the struggle against fascism in Austria and Yugoslavia.2 Later, analysing the advent of fascism in Austria, he critically noted in 1932 that in Konstanz "we took an oversimplified view of fascisation in Austria". The mistake was to overestimate the "maturity of the masses and their readiness to fight decisive battles and to underestimate the capacity of the bourgeoisie to manoeuvre and of reformism to exert its influence99.3 His letter, of October 1932, to the Executive of the Comintern based on his direct experience in Germany, raised many pertinent questions and provided some of the answers, which found their full realisation in the Seventh Congress of the C I in 1935. His vast experience, both personal and organisational, of the onset of fascism and its character and the fight waged against it in Bulgaria, the Balkans and West European countries, uniquely equipped him with first-hand knowledge of both the enemy and the forces ranged against it. It was his greatness as a Marxist-Leninist that he synthesised this experience theoretically, and the process found its