HOSPITALS BILL 59 possible after this only if the "workman" is not, "immediately after the commencement of any disciplinary action against him, given an option in the prescribed manner to be governed by the provisions of any classification, control and appeal rules in force in the establishment" [Clause 12(4)]. Industrial disputes must be referred first to the Local Consultative Council, then to the Consultative Council, and only if a "fair and amicable settlement" is not arrived at there, do they come up for arbitration [Clause 13(4)]. Throughout this period the employer's disputed order remains effective. The facade of impartiality is sought to be maintained by having an equal number of representatives of employers and 'workmen' at all levels, but once again this proves to be totally illusory. Whereas the employers can freely nominate their representatives, the representatives of the 'workmen' can only be selected from 'recognised' trade unions according to norms laid down by such unions. The conditions of recognition laid down by the Bill deny 'workmen' the right to choose freely their union leaders. Clause 2 (d) withholds recognition from unions which have even one office-bearer who is not a 'workman' of the institution. Further, Clause 2(c), requiring a minimum registered membership of 30 per cent of workmen in the establishment before recognition can be granted, lays the basis for Clause 9 envisaging recognition of upto three unions Thus the Bill provides amply for setting up 'stooge' unions to neutralise the effect of 'equal' representation of 'workmen' at various levels of settlement. As a final touch, the arbitration board, composed of a government approved 'independent' person as chairman, and one representative each of the employers and the 'workmen' can arrive at a "majority decision" [Clause 13 (9)] which will be final for the parties to the dispute ! As if this were not sufficient guarantee of the nature of the awards that would be forthcoming, the "appropriate government" is empowered to "make an order rejecting or modifying such award" [Clause 17 (3)]. The Hospitals and Other Institutions Bill is clearly reflective of the anti-democratic nature of the ruling class strategy for the 'development' of the country. This cuts across apparent differences among the ruling class parties and accounts for the nauseating similarity of the prescriptions made through policy statements and legislative initiatives of these parties when they come to power. Distinguishing sharply among themselves as they struggle for control over the governmental apparatus, their commonness of approach is clear once they come to power. This Bill is a particularly illuminating example, as even the terminiology of the present Congress (I) piloted Bill is reminiscent of the Hospital and Educational Institutions Bill brought before Parliament by Morarji Desai's Janata government in 1978. The prejudicial class bias of the Bill is undisguised. Even a