(JB SOCIAL SCIENTIST / According to Xw, agricultural production suffered again Iriben the Cultural Revolution resurrected the policies of the Great Leap Forward, private plots which provided substantial quantities of vegetables, poultry etc were abolished and the state completely took over all commercial operations, while it was in no position to effectively run them. However, Xue gives no quantitative data on the actual growth rates in agriculture during this^ period except for mentioning that the per capita availability of foodgrains in 1977 wais the s^m^ as in 1957. It can be infened from this that the rate of fecowth of foodgrain production between 1957 and 1977 was roughly equal to the population growth and no higher than that of India for a comparable period* r In industry, the high rates of growth achieved till 1958 are explained as a consequence of thb gradual transformation in the relations of^production, which corresponded at each stage to the level of the productive forces. While the Kuomintang's "bureaucrat^ capital^9 was confiscated immediately after the revolution and incorporated as the state sector^ which in 1949 accounted for 34.7 per cent of the total value of industrial output, the rest of the private sectoc vtas mcbrporated into the state sector by a policy of "buying off" of the national capitalists. The state initially gained control over this sector by supplying them with raw materials and buying the finished products. This ttiade possible the indirect control of the private rector, in which further investments weire made by the state and the joint state-priVateisector emerged. By 1956, this transformation was almost complete and the state sector accounted for 367.5 per cent of tfae total gross industrial output, While the joint state-private industry accounted for 32 5 per cent. The capitalists in these enterprises were given a fixed interest payment on their shares. This was abolished ial 1967 during the Cultural Revolution ahd this act in one str6ke incorporated the joint state-private sector as part of the state socialist sector. According to Xue, this policy of the "buying off" of the capitalists was possible m Chin^, unlike in the case of the Soviet Union, both because of the alliance forged with the national bourgeoisie against Japanese imperialism before the revolution and Ihfe stable profits ^hich this strategy^ffered to the capitalists. The entire -strategy implied tto large ^cale di&niptioir of production by the capitalist class in the yearly stages of development. The fell in the^ ratۤ of gfowth of industrial production xiaring ^the Great Leap Forward and the ^Cultural Revolution, for which again no quantitative data ate^given (intact this is a serious gap throughout the book), is explained as a consequence of two factors. One was the excessively high rates of investment in these two periods and the pther was the planning mechanisms and techAological policies adopted, about which more would be said later.