60 SOCIAL SCIENTIST the writings of the German historians Ranke, Windelbend and Rickert. These writers saw the formulation of general laws of the historical process as responsible for the shift in emphasis from the particularity of historical events. Human action, giving expression to the 'intentions' of involved actors, lias a meaning for these actors which precisely provides 'significance9 to their actions. No 'understanding' of human society and history is possible without according pre-eminence to the task of grasping tlie subjective intentions of social actors. Rubenslein then identifies a Cartesian body/mind dualism3 as the shared philosophical premise of the two trends as operative in the social sciences. The only variation is that 'objectivists5 (or 'structuralists5 as they are now called) place material elements of the social structure in a dominant position with mentality tagging behind as a poor imitation, while subjectivists provide a central position to in ten -tionality interpreted as subjectively provided meaning or significance. The resolution to the problem is now asserted to lie in an inter-subjective perspective where the irremediably private and inaccessible 'mind' of the dualist scheme is seen as a collective phenomena deriving meaning and significance in and through collective systems of social practices. At the same time, objectivists are asked to see the rootedness of systems of social practices in the conventional actions and beliefs of members of society. Rubenstein assumes the 'metaphysical5 status of both philosophical tendencies. Consequently idealism and materialism of all varieties are asserted to absolutely distinguish matter from mind, the properties of both being hypostatized into mutually exclusive and exhaustive spheres of the publicly accessible but independent 'external5 and the irremediable private 'internal5. The primacy accorded to the categories of 'matter9 or 'mind5 respectively, the central facet of the debate between the two schools, is thus interpretable only as a reduction of the 'polar-opposite5 to a subsidiary position vis-a-vis its status as reality. Within this perspective the fundamental point of division between materialism and idealism is blurred into a commonly shared, and theoretically unsatisfactory, dualism. Thus 'subjectivism5 rejects all but the unique features of an iridividulised psychology as the core of 'understanding5 human action, while 'objectivism5, sharing its view of the 'inner springs of action5, but granting primacy to independent, material factors, rejects this inaccessible inner source' as capable of contributing any 'significance5 to 'action5 now subjected to purely behavioural analysis. Rubenstein emphasising the need to free social scientific theory from dualism, believes that with this empha'sis the question of ontological primacy has been superseded. Thus the ground is prepared for asserting 'substantial parallels5 between the philosphy of Marx and Wittgenstein: "Marx and Wittgenstein reject dualism with the claim tliat the mind is not a private entity ... they show that meaning is not a feature of subjective experience but of systems of social praxis. ... This