WAITING FOR THE NUCLEAR WINTER 31 the entire civilisation of the earth as we know it. The 100 MT required to do this, is only one hundredth of the total nuclear megatonnage available today. Because of the enormous soot and dust that will be released in the aftermath of the 100 MT explosions, the earth will be plunged into a nuclear winter exceeding 70 days in most parts of the globe when temparatures will drop to —20 degrees G or even lower. The most significant finding is that even a "limited" nuclear war in Europe without dropping a single bomb anywhere else would destroy all the developing countries of the South. The fact is that even those countries distant, geographically and politically, from the current nuclear confrontation would not be spared from the effects of a nuclear war however limited it may be. At least this should shake out of complacency those of us in the South who had believed that issues of nuclear war and peace are not of immediate concern to us. The attempt in this paper is to examine briefly some of the factors that have led to the current nuclear crisis. The effort would be to locate the discussion in the changing context of technology and doctrine governing the use of nuclear weapons. The first part deals with the Euromissile crisis, and the second with problems of strategic nuclear arms control. Before we proceed with the discussion, it is necessary to clear at least partly the definitional muddle of nuclear weapon categories. Nuclear weapons have been divided into three kinds: strategic, theatre and tactical. Strategic weapons are those US and Soviet systems that can strike the territory of the other power. (These were the systems under negotiation in the SALT/START process). The long range theatre nuclear forces— LRTNF (also called intermediate range-INF-or medium range weapons)—are those systems, usually with a range larger than 1000 km, that can strike the Soviet Union from Western Europe or vice-versa. (The INF negotiations were on these systems). The tactical nuclear weapons meant for battlefield use and short range missions were not subject to any arms control regime. None of these terms has a precise and agreed meaning, nor are the categories clear-cut. The current folklore regarding the Euromissile crisis is that the West was suddenly faced with the Soviet deployment of SS-20 missiles in 1977. The SS-20 posed a grave threat to West European security by upsetting the existing nuclear balance in Europe. The West European leaders led by Helmut Schmidt, then Chancellor of FRG, requested the US to plug the threatening "Euromissile gap". The US, in a demonstration of its commitment to its NATO allies, agreed to do so. The successful selling of this story to the world public is a tribute to the power of information manipulation of the Western media. The reality is far more complex and the Soviet deployment of SS-20 was no more