U S INVASION OF GRBNADA 77 struggle in El Salvador to overthrow the repressive regime there was viewed as a "domino effect'9 inspired by Moscow or Havana through their agents in Managua. To challenge this, the US reverted to its time tested tactics of gunboat diplomacy. Massive military manoeuvres, including simulated invasion movements, were conducted off Nicaragua to intimidate the Sandinistas. A group of opponents of the Nicaraguan government was trained to launch a covert military attack on the country. These actions were openly publicised to gain maximum effect. In El Salvador, the US sent large numbers of advisers and equipment to strengthen the local army. Neverthless, the policy was designed more for effect, as direct intervention in the region was not a policy that would gain support at home and may in fact bog the US down to an untenable war, this time in its very backyard. So to provide "effect55 both in Central America and at home, Grenada was invaded. The tiny island nation would under no circumstances have bogged down the US forces. All the ingredients were there, Cuban presence, a new airport (Soviet base), a leftisit regime and domestic turbulence. The minor Caribbean states (whose ecomomies are almost completely dependent upon American tourism) provided the pseudo-legal cover. The Organisation of American States was no longer trustworthy on this score. The barring of the American press from the action scene enured that virtually nothing could go wrong. And so nothing did. Reagan had long been promising "action" to preserve American interests, and he did provide "action". The media went to town with the celebration and the bulk of the American public swallowed, hook, line and sinker, the entire argument put forward. After all, American lives were preserved, the marines had done it again and the agony was minimal. It was good theatre and the Administration could not care less for the Europeans, Africans and Asians who sought to bring up issues of legality. "Who wins that counts" has been an essential ingredient of American "pragmatism" and Reagan is aware of that. What then is the future likely to hold for Central America and the Caribbean ? Undoubtedly states not aligned to the US are scared. They have to be. With a man of Reagan's "vision" around, the destructive power he commands, Central Americans are not the only ones scared. The Angolans, the Mozambicans, Iranians, and the Syrians, all of them feel actually threatened while several West European and other governments are clearly disturbed over Reagan's policies. The main adversary, the Soviet Union, of course, has the 3trength to look after itself and its military allies quite well. Even Reagan would not dare as yet challenge them. The real danger seems to exist for the non-aligned and weak nations who can be the sudden object of the United States' "new" global policy. M J