JAPANESE MIRACLE 75 as shown in Table I; there was a "miracle" which requires some explanation. TA .BLE I INDEX I^ DUMBER OF PRODUCTIOr M (1975K1C 10) , All Iron and Machinery Chemicals Textiles Non-ferrous Metal Tear- manu- steel metals finished facturing goods 1930 5.3 2.1 1.4 2.5 21.8 4.8 1940 11-0 7.3 3.8 8.5 30.4 10.1 1950 5.1 5.1 1.8 4.7 12.6 7.3 — 1960 25.3 22.4 16.5 22.3 47.9 27.8 24.4 1970 92.2 94.2 87.7 86.8 105.2 93.8 96.9 1978 1230 110.1 131.5 131.0 107.7 135.0 134.9 SOURCE: Mainichi Shimbun Sha (ed), Dictionary of Showa History, Tokyo, 1980, p 457 quoted in Johnson, pp 4-5. The second point is that unlike the general impression, Japan's external trade does not play any significant role in its economy. "By the late 1960's Japan's exports were only 9.6 per cent of GNP, compared for example with Canada's 19.8 per cent. From 1953 to 1972 Japan had a consistently lower dependence on exports and imports as a percentage of GNP at constant prices than France, Germany, Italy, Britain or OEGD Europe as a whole. Japan's exports ran at about 11.3 per cent ofGNP, and its imports at 10.2 per cent, whereas the OECD European figures were 21.2 per cent and 20.9 per cent respectively" (p 16). Johnson's explanation for this tremendous growth of the productive forces and, clearly, the matching growth of the internal market is couched in the following language. While pointing out that "I cannot prove that a particular Japanese industry would not or could not have grown and developed at all without the government's industrial policy'5 (p 30), "if it can be shown that the government's industrial policy made the difference in the rate of investment in certain economically strategic industries (for instance, in developing the production and successful marketing of petro-chemicals or atltomobiles), then perhaps we may say that its role has not been exaggerated. I believe this can be demonstrated and I shall attempt to do so later in this study" (p 9)- Actually, Johnson's major concern is^o demarcate the historical-political context in \\(hich specific institutions of the state arose in Japan, and the reasons why they were able to induce a high rate of investment by big firms. "There was more to state intervention in the thirties than Keynesianism, and Arisawa (an important academic ad visor on industrial policy) and bis colleagues in the government learnt lessons in their formative years that are quite different from those that make up what has come to be known in the West as mainstream governmental fiscal policy" (p 6).