46 SOCIAL SCIENTIST of eastern Europe from Stalin. Shourie prefers to remain absolutely silent about what these same governments had been doing for years about other nations, big or small, facing fascist attack: Abyssinia and China, Spain and Austria and Czechoslovakia. It does not matter to him that the Indian National Congress, and particularty Nehru, had repeatedly expressed solidarity with every one of these victims of aggression. Indian nationalist leaders evidently become heroes only when they are bashing the Communists and the Soviet Union, otherwise silence is golden. In passing, Mao Zedong is quoted justifyiny the Nazi-Soviet pact, just in case those present-day Communists who are critical of the Soviet Union but less so of China managed to slip out of Shourie's net. As compared to Shourie's remarkable defence of Chamberlain, the passage quoted from Mao unfortunately fits in rather better with standard historical interpretations of the 1930s (by AJP Taylor, for instance): "The plan of Britain, the United States, and France was to egg Germany (on) to attack the Soviet Union—sitting on top of the mountain to watch the tigers fight." The essence of Shourie's method is clear from the opening paragraphs: sweeping generalisations about whole periods or movements, based on a few facts, more half-truths, and a series of omissions and interesting silences. Let us now turn to his central thesis: the Communist behaviour in 1942 was part of a "secret deal" with the British, a "great betrayal" flowing inevitably from their subservience to Moscow, and that these are grounds sufficient to condemn Indian Communists for all time as anti-national traitors who must never be trusted. That there was much that was dubious and perhaps wrong-headed about the communist line of 'People's War' (as well as in their near-support to Pakistan) would be accepted by many today even among^ the Party faithfuls, alid we shall be. coming to this problem a little later. But even assuming for the sake of argument that the 1942-1944 policy was as terrible as portrayed by Shourie, is it sufficient ground for generalising about the entire history of the Indian communist movement? Here the question of overall perspective is vital. In a national movement spanning several generations and a variety of social strata and political groups, differences over degrees of militancy or compromise are normal and indeed inevitable, and no group or tradition within the movement can claim absolute consistency over time either. At practically any given moment between 1905 and 1947, it would be possible to find groups inclined to immediate struggle and others more prone to negotiation or compromise (i e, sell-out or betrayal if one likes to call it so}, and the Shourie method of selective generalisation can therefore play havoc with our history, producing endless polemics but little real understanding. As an experiment, let us try to apply the Shourie style of argument to the Gandhian leadership: the result would be a gross caricature, but