U S IMPERIALISM IN KOREA 5 of Choson (Yi 1392-1910) and that (u) the political entity called the Republic of Korea (which was created by the U S Military Government) and Korea as a geographical, ethnic, cultural, historical, and national entity, are identical. How continuous was the history of the so-called U S-Korean official relations ? How enduring was the "partnership" and how edifying was the U S role in Korean history ? Let us look at the facts. There was a complete blank and a total and formal break in the official relations between Korea and the U S A as sovereign independent entities from 1905 to 1945, i e, for a period of forty years. The USA closed its diplomatic mission in Seoul in November 1905 and withdrew its recognition of Korea as a sovereign, independent state. It was the very state which the USA had so desperately wanted to recognise as an independent entity just twentythree years before. Worse still, during the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, the U S A, in cynical violation of the very first clause of the treaty of 1882 (known as the good offices clause) entered into a secret arrangement with Japan (the Taft-Katsura Memorandum) to allow the latter to extend its sovereignty over Korea.8 The good offices clause of the treaty stated: "If other powers deal unjustly or oppressively with either government, the other will exert good offices,' and bring about amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feeling."9 In fact, by the time the Russo-Japanese War broke out in February 1904, the USA had decided to abandon its relations with Korea and to cultivate expansionist Japan and help it play its "due" role in Korea and Manchuria. Theodore Roosevelt made no secret of his contempt for Korea; he was proud to be known as "pro-Japanese".10 He told Baron Suematse Kancho that Japan should have a position in Korea "just like we have with Cuba".11 A careful reading of the Taft-Katsura Memorandum, which Theodore Roosevelt fully endorsed, would clearly show how the USA was seeking from Japan an assurance abjuring aggressive intentions in the Philippines (which it viewed as falling within its own exclusive sphere of influence) in return for its approval of Japan's extension of sovereignty over Korea.12 According to Kaneko Kentaro, who was a member of the Japanese delegation at the Portsmouth Conference, Theodore Rosevelt told him: (Japan) does not need money. You talk about collecting indemnity. Instead, take Sakhalin, Manchurian railway, Port Arthur, and the coalmine at Lushun. Sooner or later, it will be better for Japan to take Korea. It will be good for the Koreans and Asia. I don't think Japan should take Korea right away, but sooner or later it will be better for (Japan) to take her.13 About two months after the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth in September 1906, Theodore Roosevelt instructed the American Minister in Korea that he should "pack and come home because the