34 SOCIAL SCIBNTIST century, though owing to the increasing dispossession of land affecting a vary large section of the tenantry and the increasing concentration of income and wealth, owing to the large export surplus required to meet the so-called "Home Charges", there is evidence of a steady impoverishment .of the bulk of the Indian population over the entire second half of the 19th century. Indeed, what is missed out by the proponents of Indian growth during the 19th century is the distinction between the GDP and the GNP. The burden of remittances to pay for pension and other sterling liabilities as well as the interest charges on capital borrowed in sterling, are conveniently ignored, as is the import of silver for coinage and the declining value of silver and of the rupee vis-a-vis sterling, which made for a possible decline in the average income of the Indian population even during the 19th century. During the 20th century, even aggregate foodgrains output appears to have declined, and over-all output in per capita terms, and there is recorded evidence of a decline in per crpita income. As to the secular increase in Indian prices, particularly from around the mid-eighties until the first World War. F J Atkinson3 was the first to point out, repeated by many other writers4 since, that the link between silver and the rupee, and the falling price of silver—which led to a fall in the value of the rupee vis-a-vis sterling—have been the reason for the price increase observed in India during this period, with a detrimental effect on the Indian economy. McAlpin sees in this development the integration of the Indian economy with that of the rest of the world. The impact of these developments on the Indian agrarian economy has, on the other hand, been summed up by Arun Banerji5 as follows: The widening of procurement of food and non-food crops for export was linked closely with expanding monetization, along with the growing compulsion of paying land revenues in cash under almost all circumstances. So trade and its vicissitudes increasingly influenced the tone and tempo of domestic activities, perhaps more strongly and directly, than in complex industrial societies as, among other things, this economy had relatively less fat to absorb outside shocks. An obvious, but distressing, evidence was the marked frequency of famines, and the enormity of their devastation. What really happened to the Indian economy during the period between the transfer of pewer to the British Crown (in 1858) and the onset of the First World War (in 1914)? First, the salient developments and generally accepted facts: a) According to M Mukherjee6 the GDP (in real terms) rose by under one per cent and per capita income by some 0.4 per cent per annum between 1861 and 1913. In the absence at any better estimate—Heston^ being totally unacceptable7—we may accept this. This would tally with the observations of many, including Raymond Goldsmith.8 One has to note, however, that the increase was in terms of the GDP, and not