18 SOCIAL SCIENTIST Jagirs would not serve the military purpose because Murshid Quii had no control on Bihar and his hold on Orissawas marginal in nature. Amiah Nowara, cited by R.K. Mukherjee as the general proof for the existence of a strong navy in pre-British period,2 Was practically a hang-oveY of the 17th century. Since the cessation of the depredations of the Mug and Portuguese pirates in the lower Bengal and the dying out of the Mughal drive in Assam in 1682, the navy had lost its former functional utility. The navy was never summoned to perform any significant operational act from the days of Murshid Quii Khan to Mir Qasim although there was much scope for its deployment. In the settlement of 1722, the jama assigned on military Jagirs amounted to Rs 22,507,012 or 1696 (approx.) of the totaljama.^ Not all the above mentioned resources were for the growth and maintenance of an army. A part of those assignments was for administrative purposes or for obsolete items such as the Amiah Nowara^ while the resources under the principal foujdars were not always under the absolute control of Murshid Quii Khan.5 As a result the period of Murshid Quii Khan saw no break-through in the problem of organization of the army. He was rather forced to maintain the internal peace of Bengal with 2,000 standing cavalry and 4,000 infantry. The external and internal security of Bengal thus became a joint responsibility of the state, the zamindars and me warden ot the marches. Such a scheme would have succeeded under the broad protective umbrella of the Mughal empire, but the collapse of the imperial security system demanded a different attitude to the problem. Murshid Quii's settlement of 1722 was an inadequate response to that demand. The Subadars of Bengal, from now on, were left with two possible options for organising a strong and large army. The first involved a radical redistribution ot existing Jagirs and the creation of new ones, and the second required an increase in the state's capacity to raise more cash. The period from Shuja to Mir Qasim witnessed a tug-of-war beetwen the two alternatives which ultimately resulted in the switchover to the latter. A brief survey of the financial policy of the Bengal Subadars may help us to elucidate the point. In Murshid Quii Khan's settlement of 1722, old imperial Jagirs were retained, but a small amount of additional impost was levied. But the total improvement of Bengal finance was negligible if we compare that with the settlement of 1658. The increase followed with the reshuffling of greater zamindari houses and the jacking up of the state's revenue demand in North Bengal. Old imperial Jagirs continued in times of Shujauddin but some important changes took place in the state's financial policy. Attempts were made to increase Jagir lands in Bihar and Orissa. Reassessment and'readjustment of revenue-demand in the frontier districts, which were settled and brought under firm control, came on the agenda of the state. This policy especially the state's expansion in North Bihar continued in the reign ofSarfaraj. This process was disrupted after 1741. The loss of effective control of the state on a large agricultural area in the troubled days of Alivardi removed the material ground for reorganizing the armv on Jagirdari basis. From that period, recurring attempts to strengthen finance mainly through cesses gave the state an arbitrary and plundering character. This character became more apparent in the following reigns ofSiraj and Mir J afar. A departure was made during the reign of Mir Qasim. He made an all-out drive to increase the financial capacity of the state. Priority was given to resumption of imperial Jagir lands, reassessment of frontier districts and expansion in new areas. Additional impositions were mzde on some underassessed zamindaris. Resumption