4 SOCIAL SCIENTIST Administration towards arms control, the challenge of Reaganites to the reigning orthodoxy of mutual assured destruction, their embrace of the idea of victory in a nuclear war, the new use of strategic defences or star war techniques, represented the crisis in Soviet-American relations, as well as an upheaval in western strategic thought The challenge to the doctrine of deterrence also emerged from an unexpected quarter—the rising peace movements in the West. The disillusionment with the traditional ideas of deterrence and arms control, which had quite obviusly failed to curb the nuclear arms race, and intensified fears of a nuclear holocaust, brought forth critical questioning of nuclear deterrence, by the people hitherto uninitiated in nuclear strategy. These included a variety of groups, including the Church. The argument of this paper is to suggest that the theory of deterrence had contained its own seeds of destruction, and given its inherent and unshakeable faith in nuclear weapons as instruments of policy, it was bound to lead the world closer and closer to the nuclear precipice. It is also suggested that as a solution for the avoidance of global and cataclysmic war, the theory of nuclear deterrence is not only inefficient but dangerous. The Concept of Deterrence Although it is in the nuclear age that deterrence has been elevated to an exalted position, the concept itsif is an old one and goes back to the very beginnings of human conflict. In its most rudimentary form, deterrence is a specific type of relationship in which an actor-a state, group or an individual—seeks to influence the behaviour of another in desired directions. While ^t party can influence another in many different ways, deterrence is distinctive Resting primarily upon threats of sanction or deprivation, deterrence is an attempt to indicate to an opponent that the costs of an action by him far outweigh benefits. Under deterrence, an a<:tor A seeks to prevent another B from undertaking a course of action which A considers undesirable, by threatening to inflict unacceptable costs upon B in the event if the action is taken. The strategy of deterrence has at least three requirements—capability, credibility and communication. The state undertaking the deterrence strategy requires demonstrable physical capacity for imposing unbearable costs relative to any likely gain his opponent could hope to achieve. Such capability would not, of course, be sufficient if the challenger is unable to assess carefully the cost-benefit tradeoffs. Therefore, deterrence assumess larionality^ in the thought and behaviour of both sides involved. If either or both fail to make cold and sober calculations of potential risk and gain of any action, deterrence is likely to break down. However, there are no universal standards to judge rationality, and the calculations of costs and benefits could be highly subjective. In the pre-nudeAr era, rational assessments of relative military capabilities was at best problematical, leaving considerable room for miscalculations and mistakes. Since such assessments were highly subjective and could only be pro-