34 SOCIAL SCIENTIST tvpe 'decentralised" administrative infrastructure was created to effectivelv implement this rural development policy. The striking postulate of the policy was that planning and execution were to be based on traditions and cultural values of the people and all households involved in a spirit of cooperation in an informal consensus mechanism. Ignoring inherited disparities in the rural social structure was instrumental in widening the already existing divisions among the various agrarian classes. Subsidized inputs, credit, extension services, marketing and other advantages went to the substantial farmers while the poor majority continued to remain outside the organization and functioning of the program (Dube, 1967 : 82-8S). The Pnnchayati Raj instead of restructuring rural power, legitimised and consolidated the already existing political inequality Pathv. 19SH The crux of the programme was the idea that exogenous forces alone could stimulate the motivation for change in rural society. This facilitated adoption of Western technologies and 'aid\ Leave alone the political leadership, even the so-called value free scholars, never questioned the political and ideological significance of the programme which originated from a doubtful source. Instead they reacted favourably. However, the scarcity of food and employment led to unrest among the rural poor and forced the international and national planners to reorient the rural policy. Prelude \o Green Revolution In the 1960s, Community Development Schemes became more and more shallow and were finally dropped altogether. Ensminger of the Ford Foundation had already suggested that the Indian Prime Minister and Planning Commission seek the advice of American experts. Accordingly, the ( hief economist of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, S. Johnson, had headed a team which presented the Food Crisis Report in 1959. The recommendations included higher price for food grains, increased-distribution of ( hemical fertilizers, managerial improvment of water supplies, and concentration of development efforts in irrigated areas with the highest potential to raise grain output. The Indian government accepted the Ten-point Intensive Agricultural District Program (IADP) in 1960. The Ford Foundation, contributing $10.5 million, pioneered the IADP in fifteen districts in 1961; it was subsequently extended to 114 districts bv 1965. When the Ministry of Food and Agriculture showed some reluctance, Ensminger threatened that they would withdraw aid unless the Indian government met its commitment (Rosen. 19S5:77). The Ford Foundation thus succeeded in rearing its brainchild, tlie IADP. This development strategy, overtly concentrated on the rural rich in developed regions and supplied them with liberal credit, subsidized inputs, price incentives, technical advice and market facilities. Although Ford Foundation was instrumental in implementing this elitist technocratic approach to agricultural development, the American" Embassy. US AID mission, (he MtT Centre, Peace Corps, World Bank and