CASE AGAINST THE BOMB 51 make anything more than a token of participation prior to a Japanese collapse.... Unless we, came out of the war with a decisive balance of power over Russia, we could be in no position to checkmate Russian expansion".2 Indeed, the manner in which Truman, accompanied by Churchill tried to intimidate Stalin with the information on the newly acquired atom bomb at Postdam in August 1945, only betrayed thier intention. Marshal Zhukov narrated in his Reminiscences and Reflections what took place be)tween them. He had to say the following after Truman informed Stalin that t;he United States possessed a bomb of exceptional power: "As was later reported abroad, at that moment, Churchill pinned his eyes on Stalin's face, eager to observe his reaction. However, Stalin did nbt betray his feelings and pretended he saw nothing special in what Truman had said. Both Churchill and many other British and American commentators subsequently surmized that Stalin had probably failed to fathom the significance of the information received".s Stalin fully understood what had been talked about. After relating the conversation to Molotov, he contacted Soviet physicist Kurchatov and asked him to speed up the Soviet exercise on atom bomb. Zhukov continues : "It was clear already that the U.S. Government was going to use the atomic bomb for reaching its imperialist goals from a position of strength. This was corroborated on August 6 and 9. Without any military need whatsoever, the Americans dropped two atomic bombs on the peaceful and densely-populated Japanese cities of Nagasaki and Hiroshima".4 A more forthright statement made by the General entrusted with the direction of the renowned physicists engaged in the Manhattan project for manufacture of the nuclear bomb, reflected the mind of an influential section of the U.S. army. Joseph Rotblat was among the distinguished scientists working on the Manhattan project. Recounting his experiences with the project, Rotblat states : "1^ March 1944,1 experienced a disagreeable shock. In a casual conversation, General Leslie Groves, the head of the Manhattan project, said : 'You realize, of course, that the real purpose of making the bomb is to subdue our chief enemy, the Russians. Until then I had thought that our work was to prevent a Nazi victory. Now I was told that the weapon we were preparing was really against Russia".5 Rotblat left the project by the end ot 1944 when it had became evident that the Germans had abandoned the move to secure the bomb for themselves. That the nuclear weapon could become instrumental in creating tension between the two countries in the postwar world was foreseen in the perceptive minds of Einstein, Leo Szilard, Niels Bohr and a number of physicists and statesmen. Even before the bomb was actually deployed, they had tried to persuade Ropsevelt to come to an agreement with Sbviet Union to share its