54 SOCIAL SCIENTIST with its use unless she withdraw from Berlin and East Germany. The suggestion was not acted upon.8 The possible outcome of an attack on the Soviet Union before she came to secure nuclear bomb for herself was analysed by statesmen in the United States even earlier in 1946. Henry Wallace, for instance, had warned; "If we should attempt to destroy all principal Russian cities and her heavy industry, we might well succeed. But the immediate counter-measure which such an attack would call for, is the prompt occupation of all continental Europe by the Red Army. Would we be prepared to destroy the cities of all Europe to finish what we started"9 The United States was again caught in a dilemma when during the Korean war in 1950, the United Nations Forces under the leadership of General MacArthur swept northwards towards the Yalu river beyond which lay the borders of China. Mao Tse Tung declared that China was not afraid of the nuclear bomb and dubbed it as a "paper tiger". The Chinese Government warned that they would intervene in the war if the UN Forces continued their progress towards the Yalu river. The Chinese forces later did intervene and* pushed the UN forces back to the 38th Parallel before a cease-fire was agreed to. The nuclear bombs stayed where they were. A similar situation was faced by France when she met with reverses in miliatry conflicts in Indo-Chinain 1954. France had to give way ultimately to Vietnamese forces after her debacle at Dien Bien Phu, although sfie had acquired the nuclear bomb. Pakistan's strategists must also realise that if she chose to mount a nuclear attack against India they have to face a logistic problem similar to the one U.S. strategists faced in Europe. Any nuclear attack against India has to be away from Pakistan's own border lest the radioactive fall-out affects her own army as well. This leaves her border open to being overrun by the Indian army. Considering the relative size of the population of the two countries, Pakistan's atomic bomb would remain a "paper tiger", meant for intimidation of Indian population rather than for its actual deployment. One may consider in this context that although India could not maintain cordial relations with China over the two decades 'after the border clashes, it was not thought necessary for her to manufacture the atom bomb to deter any Chinese aggression. If India has been able to live with China in possession of the bomb for over two decades, she can as well live with Pakistan with the same equanimity of mind. One should recognize in this connection that sufficient grounds for concern to Pakistan were provided when Indian carried out an underground-nuclear explosion at Pokharan in May 1974. While the scientific merits of the exercise remain in doubt, the effect it had on Pakistan has been quite evident. The pressure to drive India to manufacture an atom bomb as a deterrent to Pakistan is misdirected. It cannot but be the beginning of a policy of costly escalation of the arms race between the two countries which neither can