NUCLEAR AMBIGUITY 57 nuclear option, and making nuclear weapons. In this paper, I propose to briefly examine some of the arguments which have been put forward in favour of nuclear ambiguity. Even preliminary arguments will show that nuclear ambiguity cannot be justified by any considerations of national security. I will also attempt to explore other options, to show that such options do indeed exist, and moreover, are valid and viable politically. One of the most eloquent and articulate proponents of nuclear ambiguity has been Mr. K. Subrahmanyam. He has written a number of articles in newspapers and strategic journals, as well as books, in which he argues his point of view. In fact, K. Subrahmanyam has emerged as the principal spokesman of Indian nuclear policy before die public. One cannot but agree with many of the premises of KS's arguments, such as his contention that nuclear disarmament is not a local problem but a global one, that the NPT is a blatantly discriminatory treaty and that no self-respecting nation should be party to it. However, if we look a little more closely at the arguments made from these premises, we find that there are many gaps and omissions, and that his conclusions sometimes do not follow from the arguments. In particular, his major conclusion—that political realities today require a policy of nuclear ambiguity—does not follow from any argument put forward by him. Let us first look at the ^deterrence argument9. In a recent article, K. Subrahmanyam argues that "If the doctrine ofdeterrence-which cannot be proved or disproved—is asserted by the United States and the Soviet Union has to deal with the United States on that basis, then other nations have to deal with these powers on the same basis whether or not the countries concerned subscribed to their belief systems." In a recent interview given to Gentleman, he says "Our nuclear arrsenal should be geared to deterrence and not for the purpose of war." KS goes on to argue that deterrence is always with respect to a perceived adversary. In his perception, as it emerges in various writings, the perceived adversary is sometimes Pakistan; sometimes it is China and sometimes it is the United States of America. To the best of my knowledge, the other nuclear powers viz. the USSR, Britain and France do not figure is his writings as perceived adversaries. It is characteristic of KS* arguments that they do not contain any estimates of deterrence requirements. Having talked about the nuclear threat from the perceived adversary, he concludes that keeping the nuclear option is thus necessary, and hence the position of nuclear ambiguity. But can nuclear ambiguity constitute a credible deterrent to the perceived adversary? This is a question which he does not attempt to answer. But no deterrent is viable unless it is credible. As KS himself states in the passage quoted earlier, deterrence has a peculiar logic that forces itself upon its adherents. Consider the case of the United States. According to official US policy, its nuclear weapons are not only meant to deter the use of nupear weaponry by its adversary, but, in fact, to deter any confrontation-even with conventional weapons—with the US. US nuclear weaponry is an active instrument of