,62 SOCIAL SCIENTIST feudal interests retain and add to their property—in which case the old property relations must still obtain. We would then ask—is investing "part of their funds and revenues in commercial, industrial or servicing enterprises or in cultivation of land through wage labour at least on part of their holdings'5 to be equated with elimination of feudal interests ? If this is not so, if they strike a deal with the bourgeoisie as 'feudals' to ^accept suzerainty', if in "probably still large regions" feudal and semi-feudal relations still persist and the bourgeoisie is forced to make concessions, protect and defend them, is not the landlord class in effect sharing in state power; forcing policies which protect its forms of exploitation, and make it the beneficiary of such policies ? How then can it be maintained that the state is solely a state of the bourgeoisie, whose measures subserve the interest of only the bourgeois class ? And secondly, by confusing appearance with essence Naqvi uses subservience as the crucial determining factor in deciding the question of sharing state power. The junior - partner status of the landlord class cannot be used to negate the fact of alliance between the bourgeois and landlord classes, based on their ownership of the major part of the means of production in the two main sectors of tne economy. The outward domino" tivn—subservience form only conceals the inner relationship of actual alliance. Instead of investigating and identifying this, Naqvi uses subservience to deny the alliance. Strategy/or the Revolution Methodological jumble must inevitably lead to confusion in defining strategy for the revolution. And this is what has happened to Naqvi. Firstly, till the point of revolution, the state is a bourgeois state. When the revolution develops, the middle and small bourgeoisie disappear from the state, which is then reduced to a state of the big bourgeoisie. Similarly, till the point of revolution, the feudal and semi-feudal interests are subservient, economically and politically insignificant at the centre of state power, but at the point of change, the big bourgeoisie seek "a class alliance" with them and imperialism—the latter altogether ignored till now—giving them a share in state power. That is to say, the state then becomes a state of the big bourgeoisie, landlords and imperialism, If the big bourgeoisie was not the dominant section before, how does it now become the only section in control of state pov^er ? If feudal and semi-feudal elements were so unimportant in the economy and politics of the state, why should the big bourgeoisie offer them a share in power at the time of revolution ? Secondly , on the class alliances and the stage of revolution. In enumerating the class alliance for the revolution— industrial workers, landless peasants, poor peasants, lower middle peasants, tenants(?) and share croppers(?) (the latter two anyway do not constitute separate categories),