NOTE 67 in favour of its consistent development all the way through.6 Democratisation of the judiciary requires that it should be elective. That would not impinge on its independence but strengthen it. Election by parliament gives the judges the backing of a volume of public confidence which, during their tenure of service, enhances self-confidence and encourages them to obey none but the law. Moreover, the decisions of the judges in matters relating to state policy could get legitimation only from the people. As a jurist from the Federal Republic of Germany remarked: » ..I do not think that the parliamentary responsibility of the competent Minister for the particular judicial branch can justify the use of the formula 'In the name of the people5 over a sentence deciding politically exclusive issues.7 It is true that such election is for a short term only. But permanence of tenure is not any precondition for the independence of the judiciary. Rather, the confidence of the people or the people's representatives "must be constantly earned anew by administering the law in a way promoting legality, justice and the development of society"8 In fact, more and more jurists are beginning to favour election of judges for a limited period. Kubler is quoted as saying: With reference to tomorrow's society I do not want to give up as yet the hope for a clear and unambiguous responsibility (of the judges) to Parliament. This would involve as little risk of the courts becoming corrupt or their independence being threatened, as is the case with the State and Constitutional courts of the Federation and in the Lander, where comparable practices of appointing judges have long been in force.9 There are countries where judges are elected. In Switzerland the members of the Supreme Federal Court are chosen by the Federal Legislature for six years and those of the Cantonal Courts are elected by the people. In USA, in five of the states, judges are appointed by the state governor, in two they are chosen by the state legislature but in all the rest the judges arc elected by the people for varying terms. Of course, Viscount Bryce in Modern Democracies says that state judiciary in the United States is not only incompetent but also corrupt at places. The reason he adduces is that the party organisations which nominate candidates for election to the Bench can use their influence to reward partisans or to place in power persons whom they intend to use for their own purposes.1 ° The Viscount has his own reasons for saying why state judiciary in the United States is corrupt and inefficient. He asks, "Why does popular election, which the Swiss do not condemn, give bad results in the States of the American Union ?'5 He answers: Mainly because in the former the matters that come before the Courts are comparatively small, whereas in the latter it may be well worth