&TROM OVEk MALfcANGlkl 4$ paid at the rate of one anna per day. Finally, there were forced recruits who carried dak and luggage of the officials of the estate and the government when they went out on tours. They were paid fixed amounts considered inadequate by the recruits themselves. The system of bethi was, in general, hated by the people of Malkangiri. For example, the Koyas prefe-red to settle down in the interior areas for fear of being recruited for hethi13 While bethi represented labour-extraction unconnected with any credit mechanism, the goti system was one of bonded labour in return for advances in money or grain. The goti system implied that on receiving some advance in money or grain the person engaged himself by a written agreement to be a labourer for his creditor for agricultural and domestic purposes as long as the loan together with the interest remained unpaid What needs to be emphasised is that 'hill-men', who were mustajars, also recruited gotis. The system degenerated into serfdom since the sowcars took advantage of the illiteracy of the people to manipulate calculations. This contributed significantly to the problem of landlessness and migrations^ outside the zamindari. Gudem was the forced supply of provisions and thatching material to the estate and its officials, government officials as well as contractors of the Public Works Department, on payment of a fraction of the actual price. Malkangiri was notorious for this illegal practice which created great hardships for the people.15 The system of taxation in the estate was arbitrary and exploitative. Our evidence indicates that in Malkangiri the land tax was levied in three ways. Normally, the raiyat paid as rent a quantity of grain equal to the amount required to sow the land. However, in some inaccessible parts the rent was fixed on the number of ploughs and hoes owned, in grain. We also have evidence of cash rents being collected. This system had certain implications which acted adversely against the people. When the grain was taken to the estate granary to pay the rent, tolls had to be paid for using the main toads. Assessment on the basis of the number of the ploughs and hoes owned meant heavy pressures since there was no uniform system of assessment, and because this did not take into account the quality of the land cultivated or the quantity of the harvest reaped. Moreover, even if the land was left fallow the land tax had to be paid. The payment of cash rents was linked to the evolution of a market and a money economy, and the emergence of moneylenders. Finally, it must be mentioned that the non-tribal peasants had to pay more than the tribal-peasants.16 We should now turn to the erosion of the 'moral economy' and the problems associated with it.17 Let us begin by examining how this affected the forests. In the Jeypore estate the forests were owned, by the Maharaja. After 1900 the penetration of profit motive altered the situation^ and, unlike in parts of coastal Orissa, this process was relatively rapid. On the one hand the forests were demarcated for profits by the zamindari