INDEBTEDNESS AND THE THEORY OF AGRARIAN REFORM 53 we first present an extreme, and hence abstract, case where credit relations have no role to play in the agrarian system. Both the production of sur-» plus and the manner in which it is appropriated is determined entirely by the natuye of land relations. We then analyse the other extreme where credit relations predominate. In this case though the surplus is produced on land it is the nature of credit relations that determines the manner in whwh the surplus is expropriated. It must be pointed out at the outset that the term credit relations in this paper refers to the indebtedness that directly affects the agrarian system and not money lending by lion-agHculturtsW or bank finance,. Using these two extremes we attempt to identify the interactions between credit relations and land relations in a changing agrarian society. And, finally, we see what implications such interactions have for agrarian reform theory. The two extremes we have spoken of above are, for the sake of simplicity, based on a set of common assumptions. They refer to an agrarian system consisting of a set of 100 households. The source of income for all these households is agriculture. Ten of these households we^term as^the dominant class and they expropriate the surplus produced by the, remaining 90 households. The extent of this expropriated surplus is determined not only by economic considerations but also by tradition and extea economic coercion. We refer to the system in which land relations determine the manner of expropriation of the surplus as the 'land relations model' and the system where this is determined by the credit relations a$ the 'credit relations model'. Both these systems are based entirely on agri-r culture and are isolated from the rest of the economy. The Land delations Model In this model there is no indebtedness. All the land is owned by the ten households of the dominant class. All or a pait of the land is leased out to the remaining 90 households. The rent is paid in terms of labour on the land retained by the dominant class, or iA te^ms of produce .(fixed rent or a st^are of the produce) or in cash. The rent could also be a combination of these three forms. That is to say the payment of a cash or a kind rent does not preclude the dominant class from demanding labour services from the tenant. The magnitude of this rent is determined by tradition and other forms of extra economic coercion. The transition of this. system into one in which production is primarily for profit can be initiated either from the dominant class or froip the tenant households. Let us first consider the case of the dominant class becoming more profit-oriented in its agricultural activities. This would happen when commercialisation increases and the dominant class views agriculture a^ a source pf^pro^t. In such a case the dominant classr is likely to dirjectly invest m land. With the dominant class deciding the extent and nature of agricultural investment the tenant is, in essence, converted into an agricultural labourer especially if the tenancies nrp nr»t iwmanpnf Thi<; ctaorp