SCIENCE, FALSIFICATION AND IDEOLOGY 29 tion of a valid model by a model which has more dimensions does not invalidate the earlier model. The above also explains how there can be multiple paradigms in science. A framework captures certain unique invariant relations at a particular level, however there can be other equivalent ways of capturing the same invariance. That they are equivalent may not be apparent at that point of time and may be apparent only when deeper levels are discovered. IDEOLOGY AND SCIENCE As we have elaborated earlier, there is a belief that science can be rendered free of ideology with its continuous progress. Ideology in this sense, is that portion of science which needs to be corrected of ideological distortions. This position would logically conclude that if a scientific theory is such that it is not likely to be falsified, then this is free of ideology. Of course, this is only a logical proposition as it is not possible to know which scientific propositions are not likely to be falsified. The key problem in this formulation is that discovery of invariance relations automatically purge science of ideological distortions in that particular domain. It is possible, however, to have invariance relations but with categories which are socially governed. The Newtonian framework of motion and force is one of a pull-push framework. His model of nature was the clockwork and other machines, all of them mechanical. It is possible to show that based on a field theoretic structure, the entire classical mechanics can be reworked with equal success. In fact even at the time of Newton, the essential elements of the theory was known. The two frameworks exhibit equivalence structures but based on different cognitive categories. The field theoretic structures are not difficult to grasp in the era of electricity, and are used currently with the pull-push model. The two above congnitive frameworks do not limit the possibilities of more such equivalence structures. The science so formulated is certainly rigourous and not in a proto scientific stage. Cognitive categories reflect still the constructs derived from every day external world and are certainly a product of social history. Social reality governs science in another way. I am not referring here to the external versus internal debate on history of science. At any point of time, what constitutes valid scientific enquiry, is socially determined. Some problems which can be solved in the same problem solving way as Kuhn's normal science is considered trivial while others regarded as valid scientific enquiry. The other aspect of th6 philosophy of science is how does one determine between conflicting views about science. Should philosophy stand outside science and orient it in a certain way or should, such theories of science be tested like science itself. This of course is an old debate and I