30 SOCIAL SCIENTIST would submit that any veiw of how science develops should be subjected to the same tests as science itself. Bemal with his science of sciences, was reconstructing how science actually develops rather than constructing metaphysical laws of scientific evolution. While Bemal located his problematic within science, others like Popper had actually located their problematic outside science itself. This paper does not propose to offer solutions to various problems of philosophy. It only seeks to show that shifts in paradigms do not lead automatically to relativism. Even if the categories of science are socially conditioned, they reflect real invariance relations. The validity of science stems not from the categories with which we examine nature but the invariant relations of the categories themselves. 1. Althusser, L; Lenin and Philosophy and other Essays, NLB, 1971. 2. Popper, K., Unanswered Quest—An Intellectual Autobiography, Fontana, 1976. In Chapter 8 "A crucial year : Marxism; Science and Pseudo Science" Popper identifies his encounter with Marxism as "one of the main events of my intellectual development" (p. 36). Compared to this, he stated, his encounters with Adier and Freud were of minor importance. Regarding the development of his ideas he has written "Early during this period, I developed further my ideas about the demarcation between scientific theories (like Einstein's) and Pseudosientific theories (like Marx's' Freud's nad Adier's) idid (p 14). 3. Popper, K, 'The Problem of Demarcation" in Popper Selections, (Ed) David Miller. Some argue that Popper did not consider that theories cease to be science if they were falsified. In this context it is interesting to see his statements on Marxism in "Problem of Demarcation". He states here that Marxism was once a scientific theory which was refuted by developments. Since it immunised against falsification, it is no longer science (p. 127). 4. Popper, K, 'Truth and Approximation to Truth", Idid. 5. Popper K, The Logic ofScienfific Discovery, Hutchinson, 1959. 6. Lakatos, I, "F alsification and the Methodology of Scientific Reserch Programmes", in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, (Ed) I. Lakatos and Alan Musgrove, Cambridge University Press, 1978. 7. Kuhn, T. S., The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, University of Chicago Press, 1970. 8. This is analogous in history to what is historical causation. The war of succession between Marc Antony and Octavius Ceasar may be interpreted in terms of Cleopatra's beauty and Marc Antony's infatuation. However, this approach does not tell us anything abouth general historical propositions ana is of little value. This has been discussed in detail in E. H. Carr, What is History ?, Pelican, 1974. 9. Feynman, R. P., Surely you are joking, Mr Feynman, Bantam, 1986. 10. Kuhn, T. S., "Reflections on my Critics, op cit. pp 231-178. 11. Bunge, M., Causality : The Place of Casual Principles in Modem Science, Harvard University Press, 1959. 12. Copernicus "On the Revolution of Celestial Spheres", in Philosophers in Science, Penguin, 1954.