REFLECTIONS ON THE THEORY OF POWER 51 which they enact but whose larger character they cannot know. That knowledge of the limits and possibilities of life, the philosophic nature of the human condition, is possible for the spectators alone. I suggest that we respect this distinction too. We do not see ourselves as vicarious participants in the Soviet struggle; we accept our more distant, modest role as spectators. We do not try to participate, and consequently do not simply advance arguments for and against this or that reform, though that is perfectly possible and necessary. We enjoy the advantage this spcctatorship gives us and try to see what is happening to the socialist idea through these events. As spectators we reflect upon what these differences show socialism to be, how its historical possibilities are structured, how the writing of this last line alters the structure of the earlier story of communism—as I think it must. There seems to be some uneasiness in the title of the seminar: it is interesting to read its silences. It does not use the term perestroika, it does not mention politics, nor the Soviet Union specifically. If we concentrate on economic reforms then of course these silences are broadly justifiable. Other socialist societies have also attempted economic reforms. Economic reforms always have implicit political reasons and often significant political consequences. Just as other reforms have had these, so it can be argued would the present ones in the USSR. But is this really what we are discussing or ought to discuss? Is it not true that what has made these reforms unprecedented is precisely their political character, and if so, should we not discuss them frontally, calling them by their real name? If this is correst, we should discuss precisely those three things that go unmentioned: perestroika, its possible political implications and consequences (which are different: its implications might be wonderful, its consequences disastrous) and what this signifies for the idea of socialism in the most general sense. The reforms can be analysed at three levels: the nature and possible strategies of economic restructuring; the varying political results, and finally, their large historical implications. I am not qualified to comment on the economics of the reforms. It is likely that as reforms directed at raising the performance levels of the key sectors of the Soviet economy these would fail, at least in the short run. At the same time, there are instances of fairly successful economic reforms which have gone in the same direction, as notably in Hungary. But I suspect the central point of even the economic reforms in the USSR is not economic. The Soviet communists have developed such a strong convention of excluding the political from the language in which they talk about their own society, under the misguided pretence that