68 SOCIAL SCIENTIST by the annual number of live births divided by the number of women in the reproductive age-groups, has declined, although there have been some reversals of this trend.9 Specifically, there were such reversals in Bulgaria in the seventies, in Czechoslovakia in the mid-sixties and mid-seventies, in the G.D.R. from the mid-fifties to the mid-sixties and early eighties, in Hungary in the mid-fifties and seventies, in Poland in the mid-fifties, mid-sixties and the seventies, and in Romania in the seventies. It is only in Yugoslavia that such a reversal of the trend has not taken place. Since the general fertility level has fallen by less than the crude birth rate, changes in the age composition of women have clearly had a negative effect on the crude birth rates. The proportion of women in the total population has changed very little. The influence of this factor is in any case difficult to determine. It is by no means obvious thai a high proportion of women in the total population is positively correlated with crude birth rates. It can convincingly be argued that a more balanced distribution of the sexes has a positive effect on nuptiality and thus on crude birth rates.10 Age-specific fertility rates show a more or less continuous decline for ages above 30 throughout the region.11 With the exception of Romania, such a decline in age-specific fertility rates has also taken place in the 25-29 age-group. Apart from the instance of Poland, age-specific fertility rates have tended to increase in the 15-19 age-group. In general, age-specific fertility rates in the rural areas have been higher than age-specific fertility rates in the urban areas. In fact, there has been no marked reduction in the urban/rural differential in age-specific fertility rates. This substantiates the conclusion that reductions in the urban/rural differential in crude birth rates have come about primarily through unfavourable age compositions in the rural areas as compared to the urban areas.12 Other derived measures of fertility also indicate the decline in fertility throughout the region. Around 'I960 gross reproduction rates were 1.123 in Bulgaria, 1.159 in Czechoslovakia, 1.172 in the G.D.R., 0.975 in Hungary, 1.438 in Poland, 0.978 in Romania and 1.330 in Yugoslavia. Around 1980 the respective figures were 0.996, 1.155, 0.946, 0.937,1.108,1.239 and 1.034. Around 1960 net reproduction rates were 1.011 in Bulgaria, 1.119 in Czechoslovakia, 1.122 in the G.D.R., 0.907 in Hungary, 1.339 in Poland, 0.906 in Romania and 1.090 in Yugoslavia. Around 1980 the respective figures were 0.963,1.126, 0.927, 0.909, 1.073, 1.185 and 0.964. The falling of fertility rates to below replacement levels everywhere in the region, with the exception of Poland, played a major role in the initiation of the pro-natalist programmes.13 One notices a narrowing of the gap betwen the gross and the net reproduction rates over time, a reflection of the improved conditions of female mortality. A large part of the fertility decline in socialist Europe has been due to a fall in births of parity 4 and higher orders.14 Throughout the region, the importance of births of fourth and higher orders has been declining. Births of third order have clearly declined in importance