PERESTROIKA AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY 5 security, the faith in militarism, the fixation on technological solutions, the adherence to power and strength, the cult of nuclear weapons, and the pathological commitment to violence remain rooted in the international system. The need for new political thinking is yet to be universally recognised. The peace initiatives of Gorbachev have opened up unprecedented opportunities for the progressive forces in pressing for a restructuring of international relations. The objective possibilities for transforming world politics towards a cooperative framework have never been as bright as they are today. But the realisation of these possibilities depends upon considerable subjective skills and a sustained struggle against the ideas, attitudes and doctrines that have dominated the Cold War mindset This paper takes up three vital arenas of that struggle—denuclearisation, demilitarisation of great power relations and resolution of regional conflicts. In each area we propose to examine the tension between the ideas of the new political thinking and the old mindset. DENUCLEARISATION The process of nuclear arms limitation has now entered a paradoxical stage. The signing of the INF Treaty in December 1987 appeared to open up tremendous opportunities for rapid progress on the reduction of the nuclear danger. The INF Treaty marks a basic departure from traditional pattern of nuclear arms control. It is the first time that the two nuclear giants have agreed to eliminate, in toto, entire categories of nuclear weapons. In the past only aged and obsolescent nuclear weapons were retired. The INF Treaty eliminates some of the most modern nuclear weapon systems like the American Pershing II and the Soviet SS-20. The INF Treaty also set a new standard for rigorous, intrusive varification of nuclear arms reduction agreements, and marked the complete reversal on the Soviet policy of verification and introduction of glasnost in Soviet military policy. Yet for all the significance of the INF Treaty, in the eighteen months since the signing of the Treaty, there is a visible slowdown in the momentum towards nuclear disarmament. Notwithstanding the barrage of nuclear arms limitation proposals by President Gorbachev and a number of significant unilateral actions by Moscow—for example the withdrawal of 500 short range nuclear weapons from Europe announced in May 1989, and the cessation of the production of weapons-grade uranium announced in April 1989—further progress in nuclear disarmament has been elusive. Further, some negative trends have visibly gained ground, most notably in the United States. The Bush administration appears to have squandered much of the gains in nuclear negotiations made during the last two years of the Reagan administration. In the name of a comprehensive review of the American negotiating position, the Bush administration had successfully delayed the resumption of nuclear