Social Scientist. v 18, no. 207-08 (Aug-Sept 1990) p. 49.


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ADJUSTMENT AND ACCOMMODATION 49

This impression was shared by some of Jinnah's associates and followers, most of whom did not believe in the imminence of India's partition. In fact, the initial reaction to the Lahore Resolution was hardly comforting to the League diehards. Sikandar Hyat Khan, averse to Jinnah's intrusion into his political territory, told Malcolm Darling that the original Lahore resolution drafted by him provided for definite links with the Centre so as to preserve India's national unity.4 Muslim leaders elsewhere were dismayed: 'the best that any Muslim has said... is that Jinnah cannot mean it and is using it only as a bargaining weapon*.5 Based on such impressions, the viceroy concluded that

many Muslims are unhappy about the partition scheme I have no doubt, more particularly Muslims in the minority provinces. . . My impression is that... there is a good deal of feeling that it (scheme) is bargaining in character.6

The viceroy should have also added that a section among the Muslim intelligentsia, including Nawab Liaquat Alt Khan and Choudhry Khaliquzzaman, viewed Jinnah's scheme as consistent with the idea of a confederation, provided the Hindu and Muslim elements therein stood on equal terms.7 Others not initiated into the subtleties of constitutional procedures were apprehensive of the consequences of Jinnah's scheme.8 They were the people who chose to stay back in the country of their birth. Their decision was prompted by other considerations as well—property, business and family ties. But this was not all. There were still others Who were committed to a secular and democratic polity. They were the people who were neither swept by appeals in the name of Islam nor lured by the prospect of improving their material fortunes in the promised land of plenty. Even those supportive of Jinnah's political initiatives were unable to tear themselves apart from their socio-cultural moorings. Thus Nawab Mohammad Ismail Khan and the Nawab of Chhatari, friends of the Nehru and Sapru families, decided to stay put in India, for Jinnah'^ Pakistan, more than anything else, threatened to destroy their cross-cultural networks and age-old inter-communal linkages.

Khaliquzzaman, too, was caught up in a dilemma. Brought up in Lucknow and close to the Nehru household in Allahabad, he was not enthused by the two-nation theory. For long he dithered and toyed with a 'nut-cracker scheme'—creation of three 'dominions' in India, with a 'Central zone* encircled by two 'Muslim zones'.9 When the reality of Pakistan dawned on him, he was diffident to cross over to the other side. Like so many men of his generation, he must have been pained to bid adieu to the sacred shrines of Muinuddin^ Chishti and Nizamuddin Auliya, to the cities of Mir Anis, Ghalib and Mir Taqi Mir and to a cultural and intellectual tradition which was rich, composite and dynamic.



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