(A SOCIAL SCIENTIST There are serious problems with the theory itself, particularly in its extreme versions, but I will leave them aside and concentrate the discussion on limits to liberalisation in those developing economies where the whole historical process of class formation and class rule has been structured on very close and specific linkages between the bourgeoisie and the state. Moreover, it is practically inconceivable that a once-and-for-all liberalisation on all fronts and total and immediate disinvolvement of the state from all its productive, regulative and investing functions can be carried out. Any way such a drastic operation is not recommended even by hardline liberals. These facts and necessities create a situation in which orthodox structural adjustment operations generate new 'rents' emanating from the state at the same time as it eliminates conventional rents in specific areas1. The Turkish case provides striking examples on this peculiar form of the emergence of new types of 'rents' simultaneously with the elimination of the traditional ones. During the 1980s, the Turkish experience with structural adjustment was unique in the sense that economic policies were controlled by the same team with almost uninterrupted continuity. The team headed by the current president, Mr Ozal, was distinguished by a full ideological commitment to the orthodox recipes emanating from the World Bank2 Starting with the scrapping of all internal price controls early hi 1980 and ending with almost a full transition to the liberalisation of capital movements and to convertibility for the Turkish lira in 1989, all the elements of orthodox structural adjustment model were implemented with a stubborn determination and with very few, and temporary, reversals. Turkey, therefore, provides an ideal case study to test the liberal expectations of the passage to an economy without 'rents'. The areas which distinguished themselves as those where new types of 'rents' due to state activity replaced the traditional rents (i.e. those due to quotas, price controls and foreign exchange and credit allocations under conditions of overvalued exchange rate and negative interest rates) were as follows: 1. Subsidies for industrial exports of significant magnitude are the necessary components of a transition to a strategy of export orientation. Overinvoicing of exports and the notorious phenomenon of the so-called 'fictitious' exports were the inevitable outcome reaching as high as 15% of the export proceeds during the second half of the 1980s. 2. The traditional priority areas for private investments, mainly in import substituting manufacturing, lost their privileged position in fiscal, financial and trade policy incentives. This, however, did not signify the disappearance of- all sectoral and functional selectivities. These were replaced by new priorities such as tourism, joint ventures with foreign capital, housing and exports. The authorization by public