66 SOCIAL SCIENTIST I find this objection highly abstract and irrelevant. The question which should be posed is why such 'rent creating* activities keep on re-emerging despite the presence of a government, totally, dogmatically and ideologically committed to the type of liberalisation philosophy advocated by Washington circles. The answer lies with the historical, sociological and economical roots of state-bourgeoisie relations in capitalist development patterns in the 20th century. The bourgeoisie requires and demands direct and indirect support from the state. And the state, controlled in varying degrees by the same class, extends that support and thus contributes to the generation of 'rents'. When certain patterns of 'rent-creation* disappear or lose their importance, new patterns emerge. This is as far as one can go in generalizing about the phenomenon. National specificities and concrete economic conditions in given historical moments determine the exact evolution of the related patterns. There is, however, another peculiarity related with the liberalisation experiences and their 'rent creation' implications in a number of developing countries including Turkey: an anti-bureaucratic discourse usually accompanies liberalisation experiences which ends up by scrapping most of bureaucracy's power on economic decision making and implementation. Since the state's 'rent creating' capacities, as discussed above, do not grow any smaller, this merely signifies the same powers shifting from the bureaucracy to the political layer of the state apparatus and the expansion of objective conditions for clientelism and patronage in government/business relations. The specific pattern in which these clientelist linkages evolved in post-1980 Turkey led to a situation in which most logic disappeared from surplus redistribution and uncertainty and confusion started to reign within the business community. This was a factor contributing to the undermining of 'animal spirits' of Turkish investors during the 1980s. The existence of a strong, well-paid, well-trained and relatively autonomous bureaucracy does not, by itself, signify lower levels of 'rent creation'. What it signifies is a situation in which conditions of impartiality (or, more equal conditions) among rivaling claims with respect to the distribution of 'rents' are realized. This is, definitely, a more stable situation for the business community as a whole compared with the highly arbitrary pattern based on clientelism which accompanies the 'anti-bureaucratic' operations carried out the basis of orthodox recipes. What kind of policy guidelines emerge from the foregoing investigation? Any kind of policy orientation has to liberate itself from orthodox dogmas and expectations. The claim that external and internal liberalisation will ultimately eliminate all kinds of 'rents' and thereby improve income distribution is based upon a naive perception of the historical processes of class formation and class rule in most developing countries. Ideologically, this view serves the