REVIEW ARTICLE 121 programmes. In this context it should be noted that casual attempts to incorporate some expenditures on so-called 'safety nets* for the new and old poor are also misconceived, since they ignore the basic premise that such expenditures are not just 'welfare measures' but are actually crucial investments in social and human infrastructure which are fundamental to any strategy of medium or long term growth. Thus, the neglect of such expenditures is a major failure, because it means not just a deterioration in conditions of the poor, but also an inability to develop human resources which are necessary for growth. With such neglect, any programme of restructuring for sustained growth must ultimately fail. The conclusions from the aggregative reviews of sets of policies are confirmed by the nine individual case studies of countries that have undergone several SAL programmes over the eighties. Of these, six are admitted to be failures or cases of 'incomplete adjustment'—the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Zambia, Pakistan, Chile and Mexico. (The period covered is 1981-88.) In most cases, the blame for failure or incompleteness is laid upon the absence of internal local consensus for the programme, inadequate external financing to sustain it, lack of sound policies over the long term, and too slow a speed of the expected supply response. It should be clear from the earlier discussion, however, that the very design of the policies themselves is to a large extent responsible for their failure. Only three countries included in the case studies are classified as 'successes'—Turkey, Indonesia and South Korea. However, the very limited nature of such success is evident from the detailed discussion. In Turkey, the first five years of the SAL programmes were characterised by high exports and economic growth. But this was largely due to fiscal expansion and contained seeds of the subsequent problems. By the late 1980s, the public sector deficit was large and growing, inflation was high and accelerating, the external and domestic debt burden was mounting rapidly and investment in key sectors was stagnating. (The perverse and unsustainable nature of the earlier 'success' has been well described by Boratav's paper in this issue.) The earlier growth was clearly not a tribute to the efficacy of the SALs but a simple result of certain expansionary fiscal policies. In Indonesia, the balance of payments showed a marked improvement over the SAL period. However, at the same time, overall growth of income underwent a decline, public investment fell sharply, both public and private consumption registered decreases and per capita income fell in real terms. The increase in exports was accompanied by a terms of trade loss which resulted in a decline in per capita incomes. Furthermore, unemployment increased and the wage share of national income declined substantially. It is difficult to see how such a performance can be characterised as a success. The South Korean case is much more indicative of actual success in terms of renewed growth rates and