INDIAN OCEAN AND JAPAN IN US STRATEGY 15 contingency: the outbreak of a popularly-supported armed revolution in one of America's key Pacific strongholds. Should the United States intervene with the full weight of its forces, there is no guarantee of success on the battlefield and every likelihood that such action would provoke widespread dissent at home. If the war were to continue, moreover, it is likely that the growing domestic disunity would precipitate a political crisis of unprecedented dimensions (indeed, the Watergate crisis can be viewed as the outcome of the struggle between Nixon and his anti-war critics). Washington could, of course, acquiesce to the revolt and impose economic sanctions on the revolutionary government (as in the case of*Cuba), but such a passive response is bound to encourage dissidents elsewhere to step up their struggle against the local US client. Alternatively, should the United States persuade Japan to spearhead an intervention, it is probable that the ruling Liberal Democratic Party would face a parliamentary crisis and ultimately the loss of power. The appearance of Japanese troops, moreover, would almost certainly help legitimize the rebellion, as hatred of Japan remains strong in all those countries occupied by Tokyo during the Second World War. Any US response to a revolt, in other words, will provoke resistance and dissent in some other segment of the Pacific Basin system, and thus none of the strategies available to Washington can guarantee long-term US-supremacy in an Asian alliance. 1 US Pacific Command, Headquarters, Pacific Command, Honolulu 1974, p 8. 2 Richard Nixon, US Foreign Policies in the 1970's, Report to Congress, February 18, 1970, Government Printing Office, Washington 1970, pp 55-6. 8 US Congress, House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee, Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriations/or 1971, Hearings, 91st Cong., 2nd Sess., 1970, Part I, p307. 4 See Pacific Basin Reports, February 1, 1973, p 29 for investment data and July 1, 1973, pp 138-48 for oil data. 5 Quoted in Pacific Basin Reports, February 1, 1973, p 28. 6 Quoted in Peter Wiley, "Vietnam and the Pacific Rim Strategy", Leviathan, June 1969,p 7. 7 Rocco M Paone, "The Soviet Threat in the Indian Ocean", Military Review, December 1970,p 49. 8 Thomas H Moorer, US Military Posture, Fiscal Tear 1975, US Department of Defence, Washington 1974, p 49, » Ibtd., p 48. 1 ° See "Okinawa : Keystone of the Pacific", Le Monde, Weekly Selection, June 25, 1969. '1 The New Tork Times, ]we 26, 1974. 12 "US Strategy for Staying No. 1 Power in Asia", Interview with Admiral Noel Gayler, US News & World Report, March 25, 1974, p 44. 18 James R Schlesinger, ^Strategic Leverage from Aid and Trade", in David M Abshire and Richard V Alien (Eds.) National Security, Praeger, New York 1973, pp 687, 692-3. 14 Ibid., pp 693-5. 1 B JK. Holloway Jr. ^The Post-Vietnam Navy", US Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1972,p 57. 3 6 The New Tork Times, July 8, 1971. 17 The Washington Post, June 13, 1972.