Prod Iuction of I^RODUCTIOFoodgrain ^OODGRAIN : TABLEN AND STOCIs Stocks at PRICES Ii OF FOOD(Popula- DRAINSPer-capil 77Ea (gms/day) the Begin- tion Net Pro- Net Produc- Year Gross Net ning of (million) duction tion + Stocks (million tonnes) the Year (mn. tonnes) 1966 72.347 63.304 2.08 493.2 351 363 1967 74.231 64.952 2.22 504.2 352 365 1972 105.168 95.022 7.88 562.5 448 486 1973 95.201 83.300 3.41 574.0 398 414 1974 105.000 91.875 2.78 586.0 430 442 SOURCES : Reports of the Agricultural Price? Commission, and Bulletin on Food Statistics. NOTES : 1 Production in 1966 refers to the agricultural year 1965-66 and so on. 2 Net production is derived after making allowance for seed, feed and wastage. 3 1974 figures are estimated on the basis of information available in the re.. ports of the Agricultural Prices Commission. If the stocks at the beginning of the year are also taken into account the potential availability in 1972 works out at 486 gms. per person per day (See table I);inthe entire post-independence period this was a record high: it was only in 1965 that we had a similar comfortable position with respect to foodgrain availability.1 Of course, this was the situation at the beginning of the year. Even after making allowance for stocks held over by the government for the next year the availability during the year was 467 gms. per capita per day which was significantly higher than what was available in 1966 and 1967 from production ,imports and stocks(Table II). And yet during 1972 prices rose by 13.3 per cent compared to the 11.8 per cent increase during 1966 when production fell by as much as 19 per cent (from 89.4 million tonnes in 1964-65). An official explanation is given below : The rise in prices in 1972 was largely due to a shortfall in the production of foodgrains... The speculative atomosphere created first by the delayed arrival of monsoons in July 1972 and later by highly exaggerated accounts of the loss of kharif output also placed a role. In view of the encouraging prospects for the coming rabi crop the pressures generated by the psychology of scarcity should abate.2 The hopes were belied but it is clear from our analysis of the availability of foodgrains in 1972 that the shortfalMn-prod uction argument is not valid. There remains the question of the 'psychology of scarcity' and how the 'speculative atmosphere' was created and by whom. To understand this, the statistics of government operations in foodgrains must be looked into.