FOODGRAIN PRICES 89 season have not increased to any great extent. This is certainly a reflection of the wide margin in the procurement prices and the corresponding rates of return for the two crops. We may now sum up the results of our analysis of the differential behaviour in the price movements of rice and wheat during 1968-72. As a result of the high procurement prices, which essentially fulfilled the role of support prices, the seasonal low in wheat prices was maintained at a level higher than the procuemcnt price of Rs 76 per quintal; the consequent change in the pattern of arrivals, producing in particular a gradually declining trend in the proportion of lean season arrivals resulted in an acceleration of the seasonal rise in prices. Thus while the production boom lasted the state took care of the interests of the wheat farmer and trader. In contrast, no such support operations were required in respect of rice since increases in production of rice were not so impressive as in the case of wheat. And since the return offered by the government to the rice farmer was far less attractive than to the wheat farmer, the rice farmer had every reason to rely on the tra ler. Hoarding of rice was, perhaps, far more remunerative than hoarding of wheat under the circumstances described. Source of Scarcity Of course, the situation abruptly changed in 1972, first with the frittering away of the stocks held by the Food Corporation of India and then with the prospect of a poor crop looming large. For farmer and trader of rice as well as wheat, greater pickings were to be had by hoarding: no inducement was sufficient for disgorging stocks. This was described as the "psychology of scarcity" but it is more apt to call it the "pathology of scarcity". And the pathogen was the state itself. This then is the background of the severe famine that has emerged during the second half of last year. Neither the government nor the Press— with some notable exceptions—recognize? the existence of famine conditions although ministerial pronouncements on the "extremely difficult food situation'5 are not lacking. The big farmers and traders have been duly warned that they would be dealt with 'sternly*. In the meantime the country's representatives are out with the begging bowl and our aid-givers abroad are busy making estimates of "India's requirements this year to ward off famine". For once the government has accepted the recommendation of the APG and fixed the procurement price of paddy at Rs 74 per quintal, which is only marginally higher than that offered last year. But this is no more than a gesture because the state governments can resort to various tricks for raising the effective price: this is adequately demonstrated by Tamil Nadu's announced 'dual price policy' which "envisages payment of Central rates (Rs 74) for stocks procured under the producer levy and the state government's rates (Rs 85) for direct purchases made from the farmers". 12 And, of course, th^* procurement targets keep getting revised downwards everv week.