INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS REGIME 81 18. See Philips, J. and Firth, A., 'An Introduction to Intellectual Property Law9, 2nd Ed., Butterworths, 1987, p. 22-81; Granstrand, 0., op. cit.; and Cooter R. and Ulen T. op. cit., p. 119-122. 19. See Nayyar, D., 'The Intellectual Property, New Millennium and the Least Developed Countries: Some Reflections in the Wider Context of Development, Theme Address for the High Level Roundtable at the World Intellectual Property Organisation, Geneva. 1999, also, Granstrand, 0, op. cit. 20. Triviality of the patented research is obvious from the fact that for the year 1997, just ten companies accounted for as much as 10598 patents in US alone. See Granstrand, 0, op. cit. 21. See Merges, R.P., op. cit. and Cooter, R. and Ulen, T., op. cit., p. 117-28. 22. As argued before genesis of such arguments lies in the acceptability of Coase theorem. See Merges, R.P., op. cit., and Cooter, R. and Ulen, T., op. cit., pp. 117-28. 23. For arguments in favour of the wealth-maximization criterion see Posner, R.A., 'Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law,5 University of Chicago Law Review, 46(2), Winter, 1979, p. 281-306; and against see ColemanJ.L., op. cit., Dworkm, R., 'Taking Right Seriously/ 2nd Edit., Duckworth, London. 1978, p. 35-36 and Jones, M.A., 'Text Book on Torts3, 4th Edit; Lawman (India) Pvt. Ltd., New Delhi, 1995, p. 16-65. Coleman and Dworkm argue that wealth-maximization as a norm will have to face the question of institutional competence. That is to say that even if one assumes wealth-maximization to be morally defensible it does not mean that judges would have authority to pursue this goal. 24. See Drahos, P., op. cit., 130-41. 25. See Drahos, P., op. cit., p. 119-44, Lacy, P.A., 'Gene Patenting: Universal Heritage Vs Reward for Human Effort', Oregon Law Review, Summer, Vol. 77, No.2, 1998, p. 783-805; and Sterk, S.E., 'Rhetoric and Reality m the Copyright Law5, Michigan Law Review, Vol. 94,1996, p. 1197-12. 26. See Drahos, P., p. 13-33. 27. Ibid. 28. It is true that there are non-economic grounds, such as impact of the IPRs regime on concentration of socio-political power and its costs, given the vague boundaries of intellectual properties, on which this Agreement can be criticized. In fact justification of any approach will differ from country to country. But, most of the arguments in favour or against the Agreement are economic in nature. That is why the cost-benefit approach is advocated here. For the criticism of the IPRs regime see Ghosh, A. and Keayla, B.K. 'Submission before the people's commission" in 'Report of People's Commission on Intellectual Property Rights', 1998; and Keayla, B.K., 'Patent Protection and the Pharmaceutical Industry/ in Nair, KRG and Kumar, A. Edited, 'Intellectual Property Rights', Allied Publishers Ltd., New Delhi, 1994, p. 151-164; Nayyar, D., 1999, op. cit., Nayyar, D., 'Intellectual Property Rights and LDCs: Some Strategic Issues,5 Economic and Political "Weekly, Feb. 1992; Shukia, S.P., 'Submission before the people's commission' in 'Report of People's commission on Intellectual Property Rights' 199&; Dhar, A., 'Complying with TRIPS Commitment: EMR Vs Product Patent Regime, 'Economic and Political Weekly, Dec. 19,1998, pp. 3230-31 etc. 29. Here it must be noted that the supportes of the Agreement support it, generally, without showing it clearly how the benefits from the Agreement will be more