Social Scientist. v 4, no. 45 (April 1976) p. 57.


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NOTES 57

movement and of the conditions in which it develops.999.

In this respect, Louis Althusser's thesis, though rather difficult to comprenend, is worth considering. Althusser thinks that Marxism (dialectical materialism) is the only 'true5 science or Theory (with a capital T) since it "transforms into ^knowledge5 the ideological product of existing empirical practices'5. A irue science, according to Althusser, must not merely generalize from the 'pure5 and 'absolute9 facts, but also elaborate its own theory through a critique of the^'ideological theoretical practices". In this way alone can a united and total scientific theory be established. This unity and totality of social reality can only be found in Marxism. In the case of behaviouralism and other similar sciences, ^the reality is torn between several competing sciences. They are no real theory, but mere byproduct of technical activity951 °.

New Columbus

Behaviouralism is nothing but a conscious and deliberate attempt to apply certain concepts of cybernatics into the domain of social research. The behaviouralists are so occupied with the concepts that social realities are treated as of secondary importance if treated at all, or they are deliberately manipulated in such a way as to fit with the concepts and to create an impression that a particular social phenomenon exists in isolation from others. In this way attention is sidetracked from the basic problems. Concepts are assuming the role of primary importance; concrete social realities are being degraded into the position of relative negligence. This is nothing but resurgence of the metaphysical theory of the state in a new form, only its divine limbs are amputated from the body. In place of ^the Idea^, we have here "inputs51, "outputs" ''feedback5' and the like, but there is the same tendency to analyze realities from predetermined hypotheses.

Jerzy J Wiatr, a leading Polish sociologist, makes the same point when he argues that the empiricism of the behavioural sciences has nothing in common with the empirical directive to draw theoreitical conclusions from experience and facts. "It is rather a matter of reserving the name'empirical5 to certain methods and approaches.5> 11 Sorokin has ridiculed behaviouralism as '"New Columbus55. It is like boarding an automatic submarine for a new discovery of America, simply because dolumbus^ Santa Maria was technically imperfect.12

The greatest weakness of behaviouralism and the greatest strength of Marxism to the claims of science lie in their respective attitudes to history. No social phenomenon can properly be studied unless it is placed in the context of history: what it is at present is always a product of what it was or what it has been. Behaviouralism completely ignores history;it treats social facts purely in their static, rather than dynamic, aspects. Thus the realities it depicts are false realities. Marx, on the other hand, set out his theory on the basis of an elaborate and comprehensive study of history and even of pre-history. Thus unlike behaviouralists his



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