66 SOCIAL SCIENTIST Guinea-Bissau in /their negotiations with the Portugese. In southern Africa, where the obstinacy of the white regimes blocked OAU efforts to solve the problems peacefully, the movements were promised all the assistance they needed. But as devout Christians, most African heads of state, like Kaunda and Nyerere, would in principle opt for negotiations if the white minority regimes showed willingness. Basing its approach on the Lusaka Manifesto and the Mogadishu Declaration, and in consultation with Tanzania, Botswana and Mozambique, Zambia sent Vcrnon Mwaanga to consult US Secretary of State,. Henry Kissinger, and the then British Foreign Secretary, James Gallaghan,. on Rhodesia and southern Africa during the second week of August 1974. On 29 September 1974, South Africa's Prime Minister Vorstcr, visited Ivory Coast to meet some representatives of certain tractable OAU member states to seek support for his Bantustan policy and also to offer to help pressurize Rhodesia's white minority to settle with the Rhodesian African nationalists. In October, Donald B Easun, US Secretary for African Affairs, was in Lusaka organizing a conference of US Ambassadors in southern and central Africa which took place early in November 1974, when US policy in Africa was reviewed. On return to the US, he told Congress:(e! do not honestly sec how one can look at the situation in South Africa and feel that change is not going to occur." 'A Peaceful change in southern Africa was seen as conducive to the establishment and maintenance of US influence in the area. It would prevent another Angola in southern Africa. After the Lisbon coup, it became clear that if a peaceful settlement was not reached in Rhodesia between the present African nationalist leadership soon. the white minority leaders would have to settle eventually with Marxist-oriented leaders who would be bound to emerge and take over the resistance leadership as the armed struggle developed. The examples of Mozambique, Angola, Guinea-Bissau and Algeria support the notion that the more protracted the armed struggle is, the more likely the leadership will pass into more progressive and socialist hands. Such a development would be contrary to the interests of most of the present nationalist leaders of Zimbabwe and to those of international imperialism and the neocolonialist African states. This explains why in spite of the refractory nature and bigotry of the Smith regime in Salisbury so many hopeless negotiations have taken place, and continue to take place, with the African nationalist leadership. While it is not wrong in principle to negotiate with the enemy, a truly anti-imperialist liberation movement should not negotiate with the enemy when that enemy is still arrogant, instransigcnt and not ready to give in on fundamental issues. The struggle should continue unabated. The Zimbabwe masses expect their senior leadership to give priority to organizing the struggle instead of spending weeks or months 6000 miles away in Geneva negotiating at a conference convened and chaired