Social Scientist. v 6, no. 66-67 (Jan-Feb 1978) p. 85.


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TRENDS IN THE JUTE INDUSTRY 85

Production of jute goods which stood at 1026 thousand tonnes in 1947 declined up to 1950 »when it stood at 849.9 thousand tonnes (See Table I). The Korean War (September 1949-April 1951) strengthened speculative expectations, price's tended to rise and stocks accumulated to an unprecedented level of 116.8 thousand tonnes in 1952. After partition, a further element of tension was added to the uncertainty of raw jute supplies by the decision to devalue the Indian rupee following UK's devaluation of the pound in September 1949. Pakistan was one of the few Sterling Area countries that did not devalue its currency, so that Pakistan prices were inflated by 44 percent in terms of the Indian rupee2. With the subsequent trade deadlock between the countries and the alarming jute goods stock position, the mills resorted to restrictive measures. The third Principal Working Time Agreement was brought into operation on and from December 12, 1949. Under this Agreement working hours were restricted to forty two and a half hours per week, with twelve and a half percent of the total looms sealed, though the smaller units having not more than 220 looms were permitted to work 72 hours a week with none of their looms sealed. This Agreement was to remain in force for a period of 5 years. However, as compared to 1950 the production of jute manufactures increased almost continually from 1951 to 1956 aided by an increase in the domestic supplies of raw jute and an improvement in export demand.8 In 1956 production stood at a level of 1110.3 thousand tonnes.

Performance in the Late Fifties

On and from January 9, 1956 the Indian Jute Mills' Association (IJMA) decided that the 8,000 looms (twelve and a half percent of total loomage) should be unsealed. This decision was taken as IJMA felt that export demand conditions had recently improved and even though Pakistan had devalued her rupee, her quantum of exportable manufactures was small, so that India could take advantage of the situation by expanding production to the full. Furthermore, the stock of jute goods with the mills in the previous two years was low. However IJMA was cautious about unsealing more looms because: (i) it felt that even though the jute crop was good, the mills were faring difficulty in obtaining raw jute because of the reluctance of the growers and middlemen to increase supplies wd as the stock of raw jute with the mills which stood at 3.8 lakh bales at the end of September 1955 wa^ the lowest in the history of IJMA; and (ii) it wanted to resist the pressure of a powerful minority of speculative elements in the jute trade who wanted more looms to te unsealed because they wanted a moderate rise in raw jute prices; aad that not because they were concerned about the growers^ welfare but because they had interlocking interests as balers ofrawjate.

Exports in 1956^ however rfesctineil, stocks accumulated wd €he looms were again resealed towards the end of 1956 (See Table II). Exports.



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