100 SOCIAL SCIENTIST 10 See "Index of Potential Production and Potential Utilisation Katie for the Manufacturing Industries in India, Reserve Bank of India Bulletin, April 1970. 11 It is perhaps important to point out that in analysing crisisy the problem of finance cannot clearly be seen as a cause. One has to consider factors which precipitate accumulation of stocks in the first place. 12 "A Year of High Production Costs and Falling Exports for Jute Mills", Capital, December 21, 1967. 13 See Capital, October 5, 1972. 14 See Capital, December 14, 1972. Commenting on the suggestion of raising imports to 1 million bales (in a letter from S S Ray) Mr Mishra said this suggestion "might have been made by IJMA in a bid to bring down the price of jute in the country by creating a glut in the market with imported jute.** 15 "Reduction of Margins on Bank Advances to Jute Mills Urged", Capital, September 12, 1974. ^ "The Unit Value Realisation of Jute Goods Exports Falls", Capital, November 21, 1974. 17 It should be noted that the export duty of Rs 150 per tonne on sacking was retained. These remissions of export duties, according to an estimate covecs a total of Rs 15 crores a year. See "Condition in Jute Industry" Peopled Democracy February 22, 1976. 18 In actual terms export of carpet-backing under this scheme will get a cash assistance ofRs 520 per tonne at the minimum registration price of Rs 5,200 per tonne. On the basis of a monthly average Export of 14,000 tonnes, the total subsidy for a six-month period to mills may come to R» 3^ crores. 19 "High Cost of Export Credit'*, Eastern Rowwise M&reh 5, 1976. 20 Asutosh Rais, "Jute: Going-the Indigo Way?** Democratic World, March 7, 1976. ^ See Jute Chronicle, March/April 1975. p 25. 21 See also A K Bagchi, Private Investment in India 1990-39 Orient Longman Ltd, 1975, p 270» where it is argued that the chief source of strength of the IJMA was that it could take joint decisions through the operation of short-time working agreements which took various forms, including the shutting down of given percentages of looms and spindles, closing the mills for specified number of days, wofifrng the mills for a certain maximum number of hours and so on. The fact that the mills agreed not to expand their production capacity during the period covered by Working Time Agreements implied that this was an "attempt at controlling not only production but also investment in an expanding market.** 23 See "Indian Jute Goods Losing Ground in the USA*', Capital, August 22, 1974. 24 "Jute Mills: Import of Generators to be Allowed", Capital, September 24, 1974. 25 See "IJMA Praises the Working of the Power Rationing Scheme" Capital, August 29, 1974. ^ See "Falling Fibre Prices: JCI*s Operations Criticized", Capital, October 10, 1974. 2t See "Portrait of a Financial Manipulator^, People's Democracy, October 28, 1973; also see, Mr PranPrashad in Peopled Democracy,' December 16, 1973. 28 Amit Raha, "Jute in a Scissor's Crisis: Can there be an Incentive Price?** Jute Chronicle, Nov-Dcc 1974, vol 9, no 6. However, Raha, does ^ot attribute this crisis to output-restrictions. 29 See S Roy, Agricultural Situation in Indias, September 1968. where price elasticity of demand for raw jute is calculated as — 0.19. so Sec N K Gupta, Economic and Political Weekly, February 13, 1971. 81 Otherwise one cannot explain the fact that despite the jute crop remaining extremely lean for two consecutive-years (1974 and 19 75} the prices of the fibre in up country markets doggedly refused to go up. See "IJMA Wins again'* Economic and Political Weekly November 15,1975.