NAXALITE MOVEMENT 5 of party organization95)5 and the ideologies he preached. By now all but three of the Naxalite factions have repudiated what they describe as 'Charuism5, the strongest criticism coming from the SNS group in the following words: "We cannot and must not unite with those who uphold and practise the ultra 'left5 line of Charu Mazumdar, that is, the line of individual terrorism, the line of boycott and opposition to mass struggles, the line of armed struggle without the party, without the people and without politics, whether they call themselves anti-Lin or pro-Lin factions."6 The SNS group has also rejected his assessment about the prospects of revolution in India: while victory is absolutely certain, according to this group it is not going to be a ^'smooth walk over55, and the Indian revolution would have to "traverse a tortuous and protracted course and there will be no easy and quick victory.557 Again, while "an excellent revolutionary situation is existing and growing in India today55, the group contended, "it would be wrong to conclude that all the people are ready for armed struggle all over the country55.8 Mazumdar^ two other formulations that the entire bourgeoisie in India was ''comprador5 and the entire section of the rich peasantry were feudal m nature have also been heavily criticised as being too simplistic.s On the other side of this intra-Naxalite debate,, the pro-Charu Mazumdar groups argue that the setback in the movement was not due to any failing on the part of Mazumdar as the party^ leader and theoretician, but to the faulty application of his preachings by the local leadership. They point out that even the Communist movement in China suffered many setbacks under the leadership of Mao: not only various types of right and left deviations occurred, but the situation even reached a stage where Mao himself had to ask the party cadres to "bombard ^the (party) headquarters55.10 They cite several letters of Charu Mazumdar which purport to show that he often tried to correct the excesses which were being committed by the party cadres in the implementation, of the annihilation line. In one such letter he wrote: "Not all the ^Srt^Crs are our enemies—only the corrupt and anti-people officers should be the targets of our attack.55 (18-11-1971).n And in another letter he stated, "We should remember that not all businessmen are our enemies. On the contrary after an area has been liberated some of these businessmen would contact us in their own interests.55 (13-12-1970).12 This last statement, however, would be seen by many as confirming that in the liberated areas' of Calcutta, the businessmen used the Naxalites to keep the CPI(M) trade unionists and their sympathisers out of their work places. It is clear that the role of Mazumdar will continue as a major subject of debate among the Naxalites for many years to come. This is natural, expected and healthy, given his importance in the history of the movement. But what is surprising, more than the hero-worship of the pro-CM factions, is the tendency among others to make Mazumdar the