Social Scientist. v 7, no. 79 (Feb 1979) p. 70.


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70feeling, sensing, and be SOCIAL SCIENT ;lieving. Each pr [ST ocess has a corresponding

epistemology which Jo seph Royce pre sents3 like th is:

Psychological Process Epistemology Criterion for Truth,

Reality Continuum

Thinking Rationalism Logical — Illogical

Feeling Intuition Insight - No

— insight

Sensing Empiricism Perception — Misper-

ception

Believing Authorita- Ideology — Delusion

rianism

Among these sources of knowledge, the scientist gives credence to rationalism4 and empiricism and this according to be-haviouralism, makes scientific enquiry a superior form of enquiry. The behavioural school believes that scientific enquiry is superior because it attempts to relate events causally and to produce systematic explanations based on empirically verifiable generalizations. It suggests that as science seeks to be accurate in reflecting the organization and structure of the universe, so should the social sciences attempt to be in their own sphere. It further contends that as science relies upon empiricism, abstractions, generalization, and explanation and employs methods like analysis, experimentation, observation and measurement, so should the social sciences do in the treatment of their subject matter. Rejection of metaphysical claims, insistence on the use of empirical data, concern with measurement and quantification, pursuit of public, reliable and communicable knowledge; search for explanatory techniques not only consistent with the "numerical records" but capable of being accepted—for the time being at least—as "absolute" truths are a part of the methodological assumptions of sciences, and so can they be, and ought to be, of the social sciences. The pith and substance of the argument is that "the concepts of the social sciences, as well as the theoretical matrix for those concepts, are identical or ought to be made identical with those of the natural sciences"6 that is, the physical and the biological ones. The underlying assumption is that both the natural and the social sciences have common aims; the aims being to describe, explain, relate, anticipate and evaluate phenomena, events or relationships crucial to their academic enterprise through theory construction and data collection.

As a derivation from these assumptions, it is prescribed



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