NOTES 69 under high-yielding varieties programme was expanded during the year." In the case of commercial crops, though the output of cotton and jute showed some increases, there were shortfalls in oilseeds and sugar-cane production. The output of sugar-cane in 1971-72 was only 12.8 million tonnes compared to 13.8 million tonnes in 1969-70 and 13.2 million tonnes in 1970-71. The deceleration in output of agricultural commodities took place despite the much trumpeted ^green revolution'. The total area under the high-yielding varieties programme in 1971-72 was estimated at 18 million hectares compared to 14.6 million hectares in the previous year. The rate of fertiliser consumption has also been higher in 1971-72. Yet, the output figures were far from impressive. The same was the case with industrial output. The growth rate of industrial production declined continuously from 7.1 per cent in 1969 to 4.8 per cent in 1970 and to 2.9 per cent in 1971. This was against a target rate of 8 to 10 per cent per annum envisaged in the Fourth Plan. Despite the slowing down of the growth rate in 1971-72, the Reserve Bank Report has depicted a false picture of 'resilience'. Such an affirmative conclusion regarding resilience seems to defy all logic and reason, except the political expediency on the part of the ruling party for legitimation of the crisis-ridden economy. An analysis of the facts presented in the Annual Report will reveal that the Indian economy is in a deep crisis. Supply bottlenecks and demand constraints have afflicted the economy with inter-related and complex problems. The basic industrial raw materials like steel and nonferrous metals have been in short supply. In fact, the output of finished steel in 1971-72 was only 4.6 million tonnes compared to 4.8 million tonnes in the previous year. Though the shortfall was relatively small, it created serious problems for steel-using industries. They were forced to rely on imports to meet the increasing demand at least partially. The raw materials like cotton and oilseeds were also in short supply during 1971-72. The serious shortages in power supply are too well known to deserve elaboration here. While shortages in supply were evident in the above sectors, certain other sectors were faced with the problem of over-production (compared to slackening demand) and consequent accumulation of unsold stock. This was true in the case of cement (due to slackness in demand arising from decline in construction activities) and coal (due to reduction in demand from metallurgical consumers). The problem of accumulated stocks in the case of coal and cement was, of course, aggravated by bottlenecks in rail transport. Under-utih'sation of capacity was characteristic of many important industries during the year under review, particularly in the case of important industries producing machinery (for cement, tea, printing and leather industries), steel pipes and tubes and wagon building. The staggering fact of the situation is that even the rate .of capacity utilisation has