66 SOCIAL SCIENTIST because such works are somehow enlisted as text and reference books in various universities.1 Such publications might create an illusion that they are helping in getting rid of imported material, and hence of intellectual domination by the west. But if Gupta's books are representative samples of such an alternative, we are merely sacrificing quality without any advantages of intellectual autonomy or economy. Such publications have nothing new to offer while they manage to put what is already available in a very bad perspective. Logic and Scientific Method and Science and its Methodology, as the titles suggest, overlap in most parts. The only difference lies in the additional sections on introductory logic in the former which in no way can substitute the already existing and widely available material on the subject. No attempt is made to consider the Indian logical systems because Gupta seems to believe that Indians did not know of logic till the westerners introduced it to the country. Thus, in Science and its Methodology he writes that "India had no science until the Europeans established themselves in this country. Therefore there was no scientific activity, much less the scientific method. Testimony and authority of classical learning reigned supreme. Empirical knowledge was not cultivated. Rationalism and logical thinking were at a discount." These interpretations of Indians as an unthinking people are based on British accounts of the primitive natives. It is painful to see them passed on as rational analysis in independeni India by Gupta. This colonial approach to the Indian mind will be taken up in detail in the review of his last book. Here we can only presume that under these misguided assumptions, all that Gupta is attempting is a review of western scholarship in scientific methodology. However, even in this limited task he has failed miserably. To begin with, he has not even addressed himself to the most topical issue in philosophy of science: Is there a scientific method? In a book on methodology of science written in 1978, there should have been a reference to Kuhn, Feyeraband, Polanyi, Bohm and Bunge2 whose views form the base of a new philosophy of science which provides an alternative to the misleading presuppositions of positivism and logical empiricism. The radical and Marxist philosophers of science have taken serious objection to the belief in neutral observation as a source of objective knowledge in science. They have thrown doubt on the assumption of a scientific method which can be codified and articulated. Scientific activity is shown to be much more complex than what a naive positivistic approach takes it to be. Convincing arguments have