26 SOCIAL SCIENTIST Southern Rhodesian regin-c, angered the section of P F led by Robert Mugabc to such an extent that he demanded the exclusion of USA from the all-party negotiation envisaged under the Anglo-American proposals for a Zimbabwe settlement. By the time Lancaster House agreement was being negotiated, Addis Ababa had become an important centre where representatives of the different wings of PF met periodically to coordinate a joint ZANU-ZAPU strategy. Ethiopia was engaged in providing military training to ZANU guerrillas. At the same time, ZANU links with East Germany in particular improved. These developments taken together would constitute a general indication of a softening of Soviet attitude in view of the fact that ZAiNU had successfully emerged as the most popular political force in Zimbabwe. 21 In the case of Nigeria and Zambia, however, welcoming Cuban presence in Africa is a tactic employed to win concessions from Britain and the United States. In recent years Nigeria has played a dubious role in bringing about secret meetings between Nkomo and lan Smith (especially since the beginning of the "internal settlement" earlier during 1978). One of the most vociferous African critics of Lord Soames's policy in post-Lancaster House Rhodesia (1980) was Nigeria. Britain was particularly sensitive to Nigerian criticism for obvious economic reasons. 25 Throughout the last four years, Zambia has been the most vacillating among the tl front line" states. Kaunda has consistently adopted a line of least resistance towards imperialism and neo-colonialism; in more ways than one (witness, for example, the dccisf'on taken in October 1978 by Zambia—without prior consultation with other "Front Line" states—to reopen formally the southern border to permit free movement of goods between Southern Rhodesia and Zambia). It is difficult to dissociate this step from the Kano meeting which more or less immediately preceded it. On the role of Tanzania in these developments see, T V Sathyamurthy, "Non-alignment and Tanzania's Role in International Relations", op cit. 26 Even the stand taken by Owen regarding a possible visit to Britain by lan Smith on his way back from the United States was far from emphatic; it sounded rather more like an attempt to make virtue out of necessity. 27 The behaviour of Nkomo in particular over the last year or two is convincing proof of the validity of this statement. 28 That the failure of the "internal settlement" has been brought home to lan Smith himself is amply evident from his statements during his tour of the United States. 29 Tanzania's main reason was the exhaustion of its economy owing to Tanzania's role in removing Idi Amin from power in Uganda and removing Uganda's aggression under him against Tanzania leading to the occupation of the Kagera salient in 1978; Zambia could no longer continue to suffer the increasingly violent attacks of the Rhodesian security forces penetrating into its territory in their search and destroy missions against ZAPU which acquired an unprecedented level of ferocity during the Muzorewa regime. Mozambique was subjected to constant harassment by South African armed forces. 30 A study of the British press throughout the period between the Lusaka Commonwealth Prime Ministers' conference and the results of the Rhodesian general elections (September 1979 - February 1980) is revealing for the following reasons: a) Th emergence of ZANU led government under Robert Mugabe was never entertained as a possibility, b; The decision of ZAPU and ZANU to fight the election separately was interpreted as a signal for imperialism and its allies to rally behind Nkomo who was regarded as symbolizing the pro-w< stern segment of the Patriotic Front, c) The press as a whole manifested a reluctance to assess the popularity of ZANU. Even such a mild body as the Commonwealth observers group criticized the general political attitude of Lord Soamcs on this score in it3 post-election report, d) Alleged violations of the cease-fire by ZANU were consistently, if not wildly, exaggerated in the British press. By contrast, the gross violations of the ceasefire by UANG auxiliary forces and the Selous Scouts were either ignored or underestimated and undcrpublicizcd. c) It was only after Lord