Social Scientist. v 12, no. 131 (April 1984) p. 65.


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BOOK REVIEW 65

rich and complex than our knowledge of it, and there always is an ontological conflict between thought and being. It means that at any given moment one is always faced with certain probleitis which cannot be immediately resolved. Irrationalism is in essence the supposition that problems that are not solved are, in fact, insoluble. Hence the conclusion that we cannot obtain rational knowledge of reality, or that rational knowledge is an inferior kind of knowledge. What in fact we need is a different, higher sort of knowledge, such as faith or intution. This supposition is common in Schopenhauer ('World as will and as Representation'), Kicrkgaard (his agnosticism and sham activity), Nietzsche ('Transvaluation of Values', 'The Myth of Zarathustra' and 'Mythical Consciousness'), Pragmatist thought in the English speaking world, Bergson in France, Pareto and Crocc in Italy, Spongier and Toynbec.

Arguing against this, Lukacs says that dialectics provides a clear •olution to these so-called 'insoluble9 problems. He says that it is basic to any irrationalist tendency to consider Understanding' and 'reason' as identical and assume that the limits of 'understanding' are also the limits of 'reason9, so that anything not grasped by the 'understanding' must be grasped, if at all, by some kind of supra-rational mechanism. Irrationalists subscribe to the metaphysical view that regards things and concepts as rigid and fixed, and the law of absolute contradiction as binding (whether 'A' exists or does not exist, and 'A' cannot be 'A' and non-'A* at1 the same time). According to Hegel, this abstract and one-sided way of thinking is the work of 'understanding', and it can be overcome only by dialectical thinking which grasps the inherently contradictory nature of reality. According to Hegel, only reason can lead to dialectical understanding. Irrationalism is based on the assumption that what cannot be grasped by understanding cannot be grasped by reason either.

Apart from the disparagement of reason and an uncritical glorification of intuition, there are some other distinctive features of irrationalism. It invariably rejects socio-historical progress, advances an aristocratic theory of knowledge; and resorts to the creation of myths, which may not be falsehoods but symbolic representations of so-called supra-rational truths.

In his preface to the book, Lukacs, while examining the irrationalist basis of pragmatism, underlines one important point:

"...one . determining factor of irrationalism (is)... clearly evident (here) ..in the eyes of reactionary bourgeoisie, one of irrationalism's most important tasks is to provide men with a philosophical comfort', the. semblance of total freedom, the illusion of personal autonomy, itioral and intellectual superiority—while maintaining an attitude that continually links them with the reactionary bourgeoisie in their real dealings and renders them absolutely subservient to it."

Lukacs has devoted a considerable part of the book to demonstrating that irrationalism is essentially ^ reaction to dialectical thinking.



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