58 SOCJAL SCIENTIST its foreign policy, with nuclear threats given on several occasions to back up US interventions in the international political arena. (Soviet nuclear weapons, according to their official policy, are only meant to deter the use of nuclear weapons by the adversary). Thus, much as a gun be used by pointing it at one's opponent and dictating terms, without actually firing it, US nuclear weapons have been used on more than two dozen occasions, since their first use in Hiroshima, in this fashion. In 1962, during the Cuban missile crisis, the USA was able to use its nuclear weapons in the above sense to compel a political agreement on its terms. The USSR discovered that it was not enough to merely possess nuclear weapons to deter the United States from. the threat of use of nuclear weapons. What was required was to achieve matching capability. In 1962, the Soviet nuclear arsenal was far smaller than that of the US. The Soviet Union went on to build matching capability at various levels of the ladder of nuclear escalation. Indeed, the deterrence doctrine logically leads to requirements of matching capability at each level of the ladder of escalation, or at least, second strike capability, namely, the ability to survive a first strike by the adversary and to launch a retaliatory strike inflicting massive and unacceptable damage on the adversary. What this means is that if India wants to deter the USA with nuclear weaponry, it will have to build the capability to deliver thermonuclear warheads by the hundreds into the US hinterland, after absorbing a nuclear strike by the USA. What this means is a huge system of hundreds if not thousands of intercontinental missiles, submarine launched missiles, thermonuclear warheads etc. It remains for KS to explain how this can be done under conditions of nuclear ambiguity, which at most permit the acquisition of a small arsenal. Similar considerations apply in the case of China as a perceived adversary. Nuclear deterrent via-a-vis China, taking into consideration the location of retaliatory targets, the size of China's nuclear arsenal etc. also lead to requirements which cannot be met by a posture of nuclear ambiguity. Finally, there is Pakistan. In this case, nuclear ambiguity can perhaps provide a credible deterrent, in the context of a corresponding posture on Pakistan's part. But it is important to emphasise here that there are other options to nuclear ambiguity on both sides which may be preferable from the standpoint of national security. There is also the option of excluding nuclear weapons from the subcontinent which must be considered in this context. In this eventuality, the question of a nuclear deterrent via-a-vis Pakistan would not arise, since the latter would be precluded from acquiring nuclear weapons by such. a development. As far as India and Pakistan are concerned, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by both sides can only lead to the deterioration of the national security of both sides. Nuclear ambiguity on both sides is likely to lead to such an undesirable situation. The option of excluding nuclear weapons from the sub-continent and its vicinity is thus preferable from the standpoint of national security.