38 SOCIAL SCIENrST entity simultaneously beyond a specified limit of accuracy, are treated as intrinsic to the micro-entity and as endowing it with a non-causal nature. Further, this non-causal nature or the free will of the material particles is sought to be projected as the material basis of the idealist-ically conceived ^free will'. A philosophical examination of the Copenhagen Interpretation is made imperative first and foremost by the fact that quantum physics at its present stage of development is facing a situation of crisis. None of the attempts in the last forty years or so to construct a consistent theory of micro-physical phenomena can claim much success. While physicists are making divergent appi caches to the problem of the structure of the elementary particles, they all agree that we are nowhere near a neat theory of elementary particles. Dirac admits that ^the theory is in rather a mess. The departures from logic are very serious and one gives up all pretense of logical development in places/51 Blokhintsev expresses the same idea by comparing modern quantum theory to a sledge hammer and says, ^having nothing else, we attempt to apply it to the delicate watch mechanism of elementary particles".2 Such a situation of crisis provides a strong ground for reexamining the initial theory instead of hoping that the ^mess9 created by its generalisations would somehow be cleared up. The philosophical premises of the theory need to be questioned. In this article we will examine the notion of the invalidation of the concept of causality claimed by the Copenhagen Interpretation. The Concept of Causality Basic to the notion of cause In science is the observable regularity with which an event of one type is followed by an event of another type. The cause in the case of observed regularity was often regarded as involving power or necessary connection before Hume. With the rise of empiricism, Hume subjected the idea of power or necessary connection to ^destructive analysis." According to Hume the idea of any given cause A is perfectly separable in our minds from the idea of B, which is said to be its effect, and that no logical contradiction is involved in saying that A occurs but B does not. Therefore, there was no necessary connection between A and B; the connection was nothing more than constant conjunction of the two types of events. The reduction of causation to constant conjunction cannot be sustained for a regular association between a set of conditions A and another set B does not necessarly imply that A is the cause of B. It may be that A and B are both effects of some other cause G. For example, before winter leaves generally fall off trees. Yet the loss of leaves by the trees is not the cause of winter, but is instead the effect of the general process of the lowering temperature which first leads to the loss of leaves and later to the coming of winter. With Kant the idea of causality was given the status of a category without which an understanding of reality would be impossible. Kant