The territories of the empire were divided into sūbahs or provinces, whose boundaries have been shown on the map. Their administration was patterned on that of the central gov- ernment, as indicated on the chart. Below the sūbahs were the sarkārs. By way of illustration, data on Delhi Sarkār are pre- sented in a table and in maps (b) and (c), indicating its area, population and revenues, minor civil divisions, and allocation within those divisions of landholdings by community and caste. The smallest units of administration were the parganas and the villages, as shown in the chart.

The Mughal superior services, both civil and military, be- tween which no clear distinctions were commonly made, were organized under the complicated mansabdārī system, accord- ing to which every officer held a mansab or rank, customarily expressed in military terms as having charge of a number of troops. This was indicative not only of official rank, but of the emoluments as well, and represented a sort of graded cadre, the lowest category of which was 10 to 400 troops. The next was 500 to 2,500 troops, and above that 5,000 troops was the highest rank to which ordinary officers could aspire. The very top ranks of 7,000 and 10,000 troops were reserved for eminent dignitaries and members of the royal family. The actual re- quirements put upon manasabdārs, however, in terms of the number of troops they were expected to maintain (zāt), varied from time to time in accordance with changing formulas that took into account the value of various types of soldiers; and at times the number was higher than that which mansabdārs ac- tually did maintain (sawār). The actual extent to which prac- tice deviated from theoretical expectations is a matter of schol- arly controversy. Below the mansabdārs were the ahādīs, who, though largely employed in what might be considered civil posts, were graded as soldiers for the purpose of determining and paying their salaries. They could in due course be promoted to the rank of mansabdār.

In the lower right corner of plate VI.A.2 are illustrated some of the numerous handsome coins issued during Akbar's reign. In the realm of coinage the debt of the Mughals and later of the East India Company to Sher Shāh is worthy of note. Among the latter's financial reforms were the issuing of standardized coins in gold, silver, and copper instead of the billion (mixed metal) coins that had been in vogue under the Lodīs. Sher Shāh's silver rupee, weighing 180 grains and containing 175 grains of pure silver, remained the basic standard coin during the Mughal and the British periods.

Sources (in addition to those in the General Bibliography)

Original Sources

See works listed following the text for plate VI.A.1.

Other Works

M. Akbar (1948a); Abdul Aziz (1945); I. M. Habib (1961). (1963); Ibn Hasan (1936); W. Irvine (1903); W. H. More- land (1920), (1923), (1929); K. R. Qanungo (1921); I. H. Qureshi (1966), (1971); P. Saran (1973); J. Sarkar (1963); Sri Ram Sharma (1951); H. K. Sherwani (1959); V. A. Smith (1917); A. L. Srivastava (1962–67); E. Thomas (1871a), (1871b); R. P. Tripathi (1956); H. N. Wright (1936, listed under General References).

VI.A.3 South Asia during the Reigns of Jahāngīr, Shāh Jahān, and Aurangzīb, 1605–1707

During the century after the death of Akbar, Mughal he- gemony persisted over the greater part of South Asia and the splendor of the Mughal Empire continued to manifest itself in many domains under the rule of three able monarchs— Jahāngīr, Shāh Jahān, and Aurangzīb. Although the empire expanded under each of these sovereigns, attaining its greatest limits late in the 17th century, it never quite achieved total territorial unification of South Asia. In the far South and east of India and in Ceylon several states remained unsubdued, while, by contrast, in the northwest Mughal power extended beyond the limits of the subcontinent and over much of Af- ghanistan. Further, within India sizable elements of the popu- lation either never became fully reconciled to Mughal rule or became disaffected during the period under review. Chief among those elements were the Marathas, who, under the lead- ership of Shivājī and Shambūjī, were a persistent thorn in the flesh of the Mughals and did much to sap their strength in the Deccan. Though effectively suppressed under Aurangzīb, they were never crushed and were to rise quickly to supremacy in India after his death (see plate VII.A.1).

Plate VI.A.3 relates not only to the Mughals, but also to those powers with whom they interacted in the 17th century. For the Marathas it provides some details on administration in charts comparable to those presented for the Mughals on plate VI.A.2. Some attention is also given to the Europeans— Portuguese, Dutch, British, and French, who collectively be- came increasingly active in South Asia as the century pro- gressed; but the principal discussion of their roles during the period is reserved for subsection VI.B. In the following account we first consider Mughal expansion and other events in penin- sular India, mainly before the rise of the Marathas, then turn to events in the east and along or beyond the imperial frontier in the northwest. Returning to the Deccan, we examine the ca- reers of Shivājī and his early Maratha successors and comment on other disruptive forces within the Mughal domains. Next we examine the administrative system of the Marathas and comment on their historical role. Finally, we make a few ob- servations on the role of the Europeans.

Mughal expansion into the Deccan was almost totally ar- rested during the reign of Jahāngīr (1605–28). This was in part because of the emperor's lack of zeal for expansionist ad- ventures and in part because of the redoubtable defense put up by the Nizām Shāhīs of Ahmadnagar. Although Akbar took their capital in 1600, their resistance to Mughal rule continued. At times aided and at other times opposed by their southern neighbors, Bijapur and Golkonda, the Nizām Shāhīs' pro- tracted struggle to maintain their independence came to an end only in 1633. The turn of the two remaining southern sultanates (Bidar having been absorbed by Bijapur in 1619) to succumb to the might of the empire was then not far off. Both were in- vaded in 1635 and the following year the 'Ādil Shāhī and Qutb Shāhī sultans were forced to accept the status of Mughal vas- sals. That fact, however, did not prevent them from pursuing a largely independent foreign policy for another half-century, during which time they made extensive conquests at the ex- pense of various Hindu kingdoms to their south and along the coast of the Bay of Bengal to the east of Golkonda (map (c)). The already moribund rump of the once mighty Vijayanagara Empire was finally crushed by Golkonda in 1646; but shortly thereafter another Hindu power, Mysore, under Chikka Deva Rāja (1672–1704), assumed a measure of prominence in the political affairs of southern peninsular India (map (b)). Mysore was but one of a number of successor states that rose in the wake of the crushing defeat Vijayanagara suffered at Tali- kota in 1564 and that strove with varying degrees of success to maintain their independence during the following two cen- turies or more.

A struggle among four brothers for succession to the throne occupied by the ailing Shāh Jahān shook the Mughal Empire from 1657 to 1659 and afforded the southern sultanates an op- portunity to reassert their independence. The conditions of the time also made it easier for the Maratha chief, Shivājī, to begin his own protracted hostilities against the Mughals. These events provided the new emperor, Aurangzīb, with ample cause, after he gained a firm hold on the reins of power in 1659, to send re- peated expeditions into the Deccan to complete the conquest of that area. In 1686 and 1687, respectively, the 'Ādil Shāhī and Qutb Shāhī dynasties were extinguished and Bijapur and Golkonda were annexed, while against the Marathas, to whom we shall return later, significant success was attained by 1689. The highwater mark of imperial expansion in the south was reached in 1694 with the conquest of Tanjore. The Udaiyars of Mysore and the Nayakas of Madurai remained unsubdued, while beyond them sundry west coastal states and Ceylon were never subjected to direct Mughal pressure.

In eastern India the first few decades after the death of Akbar witnessed significant Mughal advances. Koch Bihār was con- quered (in 1612 and again in 1661); Tippera was overrun (1620); and more or less steady military pressure against the Ahoms resulted in Mughal advances deep into Assam (1612– 63). In the northeastern tribal areas of peninsular India, ef- fectively surrounded after Golkonda came under imperial dominance, Mughal suzerainty came to be more and more widely recognized by the numerous local chiefdoms. The mani- festations of their allegiance, however, are poorly documented and were probably sporadic at best. Bengal, as in the Sultanate Period, was the scene of several revolts, including one by the old Afghan nobility in 1612 and another, an abortive bid for power, led by the future emperor Shāh Jahān himself in 1622–24.

In northern India, Mughal expansion into Kangra (1621), Baltistan and Ladakh (1637–39), and Garhwal (1656) ex- tended the imperial frontier nearly as far as that later attained by the British raj; and in 1684 the Mughals were briefly en- gaged in hostilities with Tibet. The treaty between them in that year is still a relevant document in the Sino-Indian boundary dispute in Ladakh.

Mughal relations with Persia during the reigns of Jahāngīr and Shāh Jahān were influenced by the thorny question of Kandahar, which Akbar had captured in 1595. The great Persian monarch Shāh 'Abbās I considered Kandahar's recov- ery a strategic necessity and laid siege to the city soon after Akbar's death. Failing to conquer it, he restored to diplomacy, trying to persuade Jahāngīr to understand Persian interest in that area and to agree to a peaceful solution. Between 1611 and 1620 the shah sent several friendly missions to Jahāngīr, bearing plentiful costly gifts and letters with effusive expres- sions of praise and fraternal sentiments, all to no avail. But through the last of those missions the shah learned of internal tensions within the empire (involving a succession dispute be- tween two of the emperor's sons) and of the dispatch of numer- ous troops to the Deccan; and in 1622 he attacked and con- quered the then lightly garrisoned city of Kandahar. Shortly afterward the shah's power and prestige were further enhanced by his victory over the Ottomans at Baghdad; and Jahāngīr, faced with a fait accompli he was incapable of reversing, pru- dently reconfirmed his friendly relations with Shāh 'Abbās.

The contest for Kandahar continued during the reigns of Shāh Jahān and Shāh Safī, the weak successor to 'Abbās. In 1638 a surrender of the fort to the Mughals was negotiated. However, after a disastrous Mughal military campaign in Balkh and Badakhshan (see below), a new Persian monarch, Shāh 'Abbās II, again set siege to Kandahar, which surrendered to him in 1649. Mughal attempts to restore their rule in that area in 1652, 1653, and 1656 all ended in failure.

After acquiring Kandahar in 1638, Shāh Jahān sought to ex- tend his western frontier northward beyond the Hindu Kush to the Amu (Oxus) River, believing that doing so would provide additional security against the Persians. At the time the area was under the rule of the Uzbeg Jānid (Astrākhānīd) dynasty, with its capital at Samarkand. Taking advantage of the oppor- tunity to intervene in an internal dispute over the governorship of the Jānid province of Balkh, Shāh Jahān in 1646 sent a large force under his son, Murād, over the mountains to occupy Badakhshan and Balkh. Though the initial occupations were easily effected, the Uzbegs soon began to harry the isolated Mughal forces, and by 1648 the situation had gotten out of hand. In that year the Mughals decided to withdraw, restoring power to the governor they had ostensibly come to help on con- dition of his becoming their nominal vassal. Suffering great losses in men, money, and prestige in his northern adventure, comparable in some ways to the British debacle in the First Afghan War, Shāh Jahān came to realize the impracticability of maintaining control of areas up to the Oxus from a capital at Delhi with Mughal officers and troops who had become used to life on the plains of India and had forgotten the nature of the hills and ravines of northern Afghanistan. Thereafter, he per- ceived that the best line of imperial defense stretched from Kashmir through Kabul to Kandahar, which had to be firmly held, then through Baluchistan to the sea. As we have seen, however, Kandahar was lost to the Persians in 1649 and never thereafter regained.

The disaster in Trans-Oxiana was scarcely the only setback suffered by the Mughals in the 17th century. The problem of overextension faced them also in the Deccan where the hostil- ity of Bijapur and Golkonda, coupled with the rise of the Marathas, presented a serious situation. Even though both Bijapur and Golkonda had been annexed by 1687, the Mara- thas, a hardy people inhabiting the region along the Western Ghats, continued to threaten the empire. Many Marathas had been employed as soldiers by the Bahmanī Sultanate and after its breakup were hired by the successor states, including Ahmadnagar, Bijapur, and Golkonda. The methods of guerrilla warfare and the use of light cavalry, for which the Marathas became famous, were in fact largely learned when they were in the service of Malik 'Ambar, the master tactician in Ahmad- nagar's long struggle against the Mughals to maintain their independence. Among the prominent Maratha leaders was Shāhjī, successively employed by Malik 'Ambar, Shāh Jahān, and the 'Ādil Shāhī sultan of Bijapur, the last of whom be- stowed on him as a jāgīr Puna (Poona/Pune) and Sīra. Born to Shāhjī in 1627 was the renowned Shivājī, founder of the first independent Maratha dynasty.

Even as a young man Shivājī began to organize a soldiery in his mountainous homeland. In 1646 he conquered the fort of Torna and soon built another at Raigarh, which for many years served as his capital. In the following years additional forts were conquered and Shivājī extended his hold over much of northern Konkan, which then formed a part of Bijapur. By and large Bijapur's punitive measures against Shivājī were of little effect, and in 1659 and 1663 larger-scale operations were launched by the Mughals, the former under their viceroy of the Deccan, Shāista Khān, and the latter under Dilīr Khān and the Rajput Jai Singh. In 1665 a peace treaty was signed by the Marathas and Mughals whereby Shivājī surrendered twenty-three forts and retained twelve, including Raigarh, "on condition of service and loyalty to the imperial throne." This treaty was but one of a number Shivājī entered into with the leading Muslim powers of the period, including not only the Mughals, but Bijapur and Golkonda as well; none, however, remained long in effect. In 1666, Shivājī received from Aurang- zīb in Agra a mansab of 5,000 (see text for VI.A.2 for explana- tion). But that did not satisfy his ambitions. Though he was allowed in 1668 to retain the title of rāja, he resumed hostilities against the Mughals late the following year. In 1670 he sacked Surat for a second time (the first such exploit having taken place in 1664), and in the next few years carried out raids in Khandesh and Berar as well as in regions close to his home base in the Western Ghats. The most distant of his almost incessant