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Schwartzberg Atlas, v. , p. 249.

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Asia's population increased by 89% over the period 1931–71 (52% from 1931 to 1961), it is obvious that there has been a long-term overall erosion in the quantum of foreign trade per capita. Further, the per capita value of exports and imports has been low throughout the period under review. Annual ex- ports per capita ranged from as low as roughly $2.50 (1944) for India and $3.50 (1959) for Pakistan to highs of about $4.75 (1939) and $10.75 (1951). The ranges for imports were from as low as about $1.50 (1942) for India and $3.50 (1959) for Pakistan to highs of approximately $7 (1966) and $10 (1965). The ranges of per capita exports and imports for Ceylon have been far higher than those for either India or Pakistan throughout the period represented.

As has been noted, the United States initiated foreign eco- nomic aid to South Asia in 1951. The Soviet Union, the second-largest single donor (not counting the United Nations and its specialized agencies) commenced its own aid program some three years later. The aid provided for India, Pakistan, and Ceylon by the donor nations, individually or by regional groups, and by the United Nations and other world agencies (not necessarily U.N.-affiliated) is shown on map (b) by plan periods and on the pie graphs below for the entire period through 1966 as percentage shares of the global totals, which for all three recipients combined came to $16.29 billion. Be- low the pie graphs are three bar graphs showing the respective shares of the same set of donors in the combined total aid given in the form of grants (including grant-like aid), in the form of loans, and in both forms combined.

Among the salient features of the map and the accompany- ing graphs we judge the following to be of particular impor- tance. First, of the total aid provided in the period under re- view, that of the United States, nearly $8.5 billion, accounted for nearly 52% of the world total, roughly 85% of all the grants and grant-like aid, and approximately 35% of all the loans. Second, of the nearly $4.75 billion in American grants and grant-like aid (including more than $80 million from the Ford Foundation) about $3.3 billion (nearly 70%) was pro- vided on a counterpart-funding basis under United States Pub- lic Laws 480, 665, and others; of these P.L. 480 assistance, whereby United States grain surpluses were exchanged for rupee funding to be kept in reserves in South Asia itself, was by far the most important, especially for India. (Apart from the United States, only Canada and Australia were important donors of grants as opposed to loans.) Third, disregarding aid from the United Nations and other world agencies, total aid from non-Communist states, counting both grants and loans, was nearly eight and a half times as great as that from the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and China, almost all of which was in the form of loans. Fourth, while total aid to India from 1951 to 1966 ($12.3 billion) was far greater than that to Paki- stan ($3.7 billion), aid per capita to Pakistan ($40) was sub- stantially greater than that to India (roughly $28); this gen- eralization holds true not only for aid from the United States but also for aid from most of the countries of Eastern Europe whose total aid favored India. Fifth, the total quantum of aid rose rapidly from the first to the second of the three aid periods considered (from about $1.2 to $6.4 billion) and then slowly in the third period (then totaling more than $8.6 billion); the relative increase from one period to another, however, would have been much more even were it not for the unusually large volume of grant-like aid from the United States (nearly $2.5 billion) concentrated in the second period.

Assessment of the impact and significance of foreign aid is beset with difficulties, and within the plethora of literature on the subject objective analyses are few. The politics of foreign aid, a byplay of the politics of the Cold War in general, have led to radically different interpretations of the motives of both the donors and the recipients in entering into aid agreements as well as to pronouncedly different evaluations of the eco- nomic benefits or harm the acceptance of aid entails. While, on the one hand, motives alleged to be altruistic are often mixed; on the other hand, the element of genuine altruism in aid-giving is commonly misperceived. Insofar as aid-giving implies inequality between donor and recipient it cannot help but have some adverse psychological impact on the latter and possibly on the former as well. Whether the economic benefits are worth the costs we shall not attempt to judge. But we do note that, if one compares aid figures per capita per year, aver- aging about $2.50 for the whole of South Asia for the period 1951–66, they may exceed the total net annual earnings per capita (i.e., profits, as opposed to sales) from exports for that region, for which the per capita value ranges have been given above. Hence they represent a principal, if not the principal, means by which South Asian countries obtain or manage to save badly needed foreign exchange. Meager though the total quantities involved may appear to be, they have provided the aid recipients with a margin for planning and investment that their internal fiscal machinery may not have been able to raise effectively.

For a variety of reasons, since 1966, the terminal year of the data of plate XI.D.5, map (b), the value of foreign aid dispensed to South Asia and throughout the developing world has been sharply curtailed. A final assessment of the aid ex- perience and of the current decline in funding will require the perspective of historical hindsight and therefore must lie some years in the future.


(Citations followed by "GD" and "GR" are listed in the Bibliography under "Government Documents" and "General References" respectively)

Ceylon, Department of Census and Statistics, Statistical ab- stract . . . (1960) GR; Ceylon, Department of Commerce (1955–57) GD; India, Department of Commercial Intelli- gence and Statistics, Statistical abstract . . . (various years) GR; India (Republic), Central Statistical Organisation, Sta- tistical abstract . . . (various years) GD; International Mone- tary Fund (various years) GD; V. G. Kulkarni (1968); Paki- stan statistical year book, 1964, GR; Times of India directory . . . (various years) GR; U.S. Dept. of Commerce (1966) GD.


XI.E.1. South Asia, Economy, 1961; Sectoral Distribution of the Labor Force and per Capita Income, 1961

On plate XI.E.1 we have attempted to provide, through maps, graphs, and a statistical table, a broad overview of the more important aspects of the economy of South Asia as of 1961. This presentation might profitably be compared with an- other, for the year 1857, that appears on plate VII.B.2.

Map (a) presents data on land use, commercialization of agriculture, mineral resources and mining, manufacturing, transportation, foreign trade, and urban population. It synthe- sizes data derived from many previous maps in atlas sections XI and I and utilizes a variety of additional sources as well. The information portrayed is obviously highly selective; only the more important roads and railroads are shown, for exam- ple, and among major industrial enterprises only steel mills have been singled out for special identification. Further, there is an element of subjectivity not only in what we have chosen to show, but also in our differentiating areas of relatively com- mercialized non-plantation agriculture from those that are rela- tively subsistence-oriented (cf. plate XI.B.2 and the discussion related to it). In the light of what has been said relative to other plates in the economic and demographic section of this atlas, a detailed discussion of the patterns revealed on map (a) would inevitably be largely redundant. Therefore we let it speak for itself.

The organization of the economy in terms of the sectoral allocation of the labor force and the productivity of the econ- omy, as reflected by per capita income, are depicted on map (b) and the pie graphs to the left of it. The preponderance of the primary (essentially agricultural) sector in all the countries for which data are available, ranging from 53.4% for Ceylon to 93.4% for Nepal, as well as for the individual states of India and provinces of Pakistan, is clearly shown, as is the weak de- velopment of the secondary (manufacturing) sector. The rela- tionship of the distribution of employment, by sectors, and the distribution of national income, by sectors of origin, as shown on the graphs is of special interest and makes evident the vary- ing relative productivity from one sector to another. The pri- mary sector is universally the least productive, while almost universally—Nepal being an exception—the tertiary (service) sector is the most productive. The difference between the aver- age productivity of the tertiary and secondary sectors, how- ever, as shown by the comparative ratios of percentage of employment and percentage of income accounted for by each, is by and large not very great. What one sees to be true na- tionally about the low productivity of agriculture appears also to be generally true for major administrative units within India and Pakistan. This conclusion is derived from a comparison of the figures on per capita income on map (b) with the propor- tion of the labor force in the primary sector for the same set of areas as revealed in the pie charts on the map itself. But the correlation is far from perfect.

Also of interest on map (b) are the overall ranges in annual per capita income. Ceylon, where the figure is 619 rupees, en- joys a commanding lead over the other countries of South Asia. Within India, the range of income by states is great, from only 212 rupees per capita per year in Bihar to 469 rupees in Bombay. In Pakistan, the gap between the 373 rupees of the West and the 295 rupees of the East is also significant.

Finally, map (b) and the table to the left of it indicate the degree of participation of males and females in the labor force, by major administrative units within countries on the map and for the countries as a whole as well as for their total rural and total urban populations. As shown on map (b), women con- stitute as little as 9% and 15% of the total 1961 labor force of West and East Pakistan respectively and as much as 45% of the total in Himachal Pradesh or 41% in Nepal and Madhya Pradesh. The all-India average is 31.5%. Throughout South Asia the rates of participation of women in the urban labor force are substantially lower than they are in rural areas. Male participation rates are also somewhat lower for the urban areas, reflecting both a higher rate of unemployment and a higher proportion of males attending school than are to be found in the South Asian countryside. Readers wishing to ana- lyze our data further should bear in mind that different cen- suses utilize different criteria in enumerating the labor force. (These differences have already been commented on in the discussions of plates XI.B.1 and 4.) One must accordingly take into account varying definitions and the likely sources of bias in reporting. For females in particular the element of bias in reporting is apt to be great.

Sources (in addition to previous plates in section XI)

General References

The Ceylon yearbook (1962); Ceylon directory (1969–70).


Ceylon (1953), (1963); India (1961); Nepal (1952–54); Pakistan (1961).

Government Documents

United Nations, ECAFE, Statistical yearbook . . . (1962).


India (Republic), National Atlas Organisation (1959–65); India (Republic), Office of the Registrar General (1970); E. Kremling (1957–); Oxford school atlas for Pakistan (1959).

Other Works

N. Ahmad (1968); O. H. K. Spate and A. T. A. Learmonth (1967).

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